Bridging the Gulf: Experimental Evidence on Migration's Impact on Tolerance and Internationalism

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Abstract

A long line of scholarship delineates how immigration generates inter-ethnic competition and nativism on the part of native-born citizens confronting migrants belonging to cultural and ethnic outgroups. In this paper, we examine how immigration impacts the social consciousness and political identities of migrants themselves. Partnering with local governmental and non-governmental organizations in Mizoram, India, we conducted a randomized controlled trial on cross-border migration in which we connected individuals seeking overseas employment with job opportunities in the Persian Gulf region's hospitality sector. Two years after the program began, individuals in the treatment group grew significantly more tolerant toward ethnic, cultural, and national outgroups—both toward groups that migrants worked and lived alongside and those with which migrants interacted only in hierarchical settings. Migration also altered subjects' political consciousness, bolstering their support for internationalism and cooperative foreign policy, such as global trade and diplomatic cooperation; by contrast, it did not perceptibly alter feelings of nationalism or ethnicity-based regionalism. Overall, migration scrambled individuals' sense of group identification, leading them to embrace cosmopolitanism, not nativism. Our study provides the first set of field experimental evidence on how labor mobility in the global economy reshapes the identities and attitudes of migrants, illustrating how globalization holds the potential of altering intergroup relations in the developing world.

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1 Introduction

In fourth century BCE, when Diogenes the Cynic replied, "I am a citizen of the world [*kosmopolitēs*]," in response to a question about where he came from, he identified himself not in terms of his local origins or group memberships but in terms of a more universal community and set of ideals (Nussbaum, 1994, 157). Following that articulation of cosmopolitanism, political philosophers from the Stoics to Kant have long theorized that individuals dwell in multiple communities, from those of birth, ethnic membership and nationality to that comprising all of humanity and its aspirations. How individuals construct their identities and mark out their citizenship and what processes trigger changes in these affiliations have been questions of profound interest to scholars across the humanities and social sciences.

Cross-border migration, by bringing diverse communities into contact, represents one such process. Migration is known to affect inter-group relations, perceptions of tolerance, and group identification (Dancygier, 2010; Choi et al., 2019; Adida et al., 2018; Marten et al., 2019; Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2013). Prior work has largely analyzed the attitudes and worldviews of individuals in host societies, underlining how in-migration frequently gives rise to exclusionary and nativist attitudes (Fetzer, 2000; Enos, 2014; Tabellini, 2020; Halla et al., 2017; Dreher et al., 2020). Missing in existing accounts, however, are analyses of how migration shapes the consciousness of migrants themselves, who numbered over 272 million in 2019 (United Nations 2020). Understanding how the migration experience impacts people who move is essential for discerning the social and political integration of immigrant communities and evaluating theories of inter-group relations and identity-formation in a rapidly-integrating global economy (Clingingsmith et al., 2009).

How does migration shape the social attitudes, worldviews, and identities of people who cross national borders? On one hand, theories of ethnic politics suggest that cultural competition gives rise to exclusionary inter-ethnic relations and a retreat into parochialism. Here, migrants who confront ethnically, religiously, and culturally distinct host societies—especially ones in which they encounter discrimination—are predicted to grow less tolerant of out-groups and cling to national and local identities. On the other hand, contact theory predicts that particular forms of routinized interactions between members of different cultural groups can lead individuals to develop norms of tolerance and cosmopolitanism. Migrants who integrate into settings in which they regularly

encounter and cooperate with out-group members may begin viewing culturally-distinct others more favorably, shedding in turn parochial identities tied to their countries or regions of origin.

This paper takes the case of labor migration in the global economy, which comprises two-thirds of all cross-border human migratory flows. We theorize and evaluate how labor migration alters the outlooks and identities of migrants.[1] Labor migration typically gives rise to diverse forms of contact and interactions between migrants and employers, customers, and co-workers with culturally dissimilar profiles in highly regulated professional settings. It exposes migrants to different ways of living and allows them to learn about and view the world in a potentially different light. These interactions and experiences foster exposure to different cultures, languages, religions, and nationalities, potentially increasing knowledge and acceptance of other social practices. In turn, such forms of cooperative contact alter the costs of clinging to tradition and the benefits from embracing more egalitarian and liberal attitudes. Our contention is that migration that leads to institutionalized forms of contact with members of other groups in host societies generates opportunities for liberalizing changes in the worldviews of individuals.

Evaluating whether and how migration shifts norms of inter-ethnic tolerance, internationalism, and cosmopolitanism among migrants is fraught with methodological challenges because individuals self-select into the migration process. People who decide to leave their home societies and cultures and embark on overseas migration are almost certainly systematically different from those who do not; they likely *already* hold egalitarian views of outsiders. As such, it is difficult to ascertain whether migration and contact with host societies induces perceptible shifts in their attitudes.

Overcoming these methodological concerns, we bring to bear clear, causal evidence on the impact of cross-border migration on inter-group attitudes, policy preferences and identities from the first randomized controlled trial to have resulted in international migration (Gaikwad et al., 2022). Our study connected individuals from Mizoram, India who sought overseas employment with hospitality sector jobs in the Persian Gulf. The experiment uncovered potent first-stage effects, with a 20 percentage point increase (proportionally, 667 percent) in overseas migration in the treatment group. The experiment provides a fertile setting to evaluate the impact of labor migration on migrants'

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[1]We note that the form of migration and the context in which it takes place are likely important factors determining whether and how migration transforms the social attitudes and identities of migrants. Migration can take various forms, ranging from family-based migration and politically-induced migration to labor migration and even religious pilgrimages. Each of these migration flows generates different opportunities and incentives for migrants to venture outside of co-ethnic circles and establish contact and ties with members of out-groups.

social attitudes and worldviews. In particular, we analyze the impact of migration on beliefs about inter-ethnic tolerance, internationalism, nationalism, regionalism and cosmopolitan identification.

Two years after the program began, individuals in the treatment group reported significantly higher levels of intercultural contact with members of different religions, ethnicities, and nationalities. Our index of inter-ethnic contact increased .487 standard deviations in the treatment group. Subjects who migrated were more likely to indicate having shared meals and worked with individuals outside their religions, ethnic groups, and countries of origin.

In turn, migration led individuals to become significantly more tolerant toward ethnic, cultural, and national outgroups—both toward groups that migrants worked and lived alongside and groups with which migrants interacted only in hierarchical, service-facing settings. Our index of inter-ethnic tolerance increased .371 standard deviations in the treatment group. Migrants were more likely to report willingness to marry non-Mizos and evince egalitarian views of mainland Indians and citizens of foreign countries, ranging from Middle Easterners and Bangladeshis to Europeans. The commensurate increases in tolerance toward outgroups who migrants interacted with in both horizontal and vertical settings is noteworthy as the literature on contact theory has long held horizontal interactions to be a scope condition for contact to result in tolerance (Allport, 1954).

This change in intergroup tolerance accompanied increases in individuals' commitments to internationalism. Our index of international cooperation increased .231 standard deviations in the treatment group. Migrants grew more supportive of international trade and security cooperation. That said, the treatment did not increase support for migration policies that would facilitate more in-migration to Mizoram from neighboring Bangladesh (flows that have historically generated pronounced anti-migrant movements in the state), pointing to potential ceiling effects on the tolerance-inducing impact of migration. While subjects in our treatment group began to adopt favorable international policy stances, we find no evidence that migration resulted in perceptible shifts in nationalism, regionalism or national/regional identification. Individuals in the treatment group were neither more nor less likely to report identifying as Indians or Mizos. They also did not alter their support for policies that emphasized either national superiority or ethnic/regional autonomy. What shifted, by contrast, was an increase in their identification as "citizens of the world"; in a qualitatively and statistically significant manner, treatment group subjects became more likely than those in the control group to select this classification as their primary axis of identification.

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Mechanisms tests allow us to parse the impact of migration and contact from alternate channels of influence. We find that it was the act of migrating abroad as opposed to economic gain or the mere opportunity to migrate that altered subjects' social consciousness and identities. First, among household members of migrants, who benefited economically in an enormous manner from increased remittances, we find no shifts in contact, tolerance, internationalism or cosmopolitanism, in line with the argument that migration and contact—as opposed to economic empowerment—triggers attitudinal shifts. Second, comparing "likely" migrants and non-migrants, we find that the key treatment effects documented in the study were much larger among those who were ex ante deemed more likely to migrate than among those who were not. The intergroup tolerance index moved nearly a full standard deviation for likely migrants, five times as much as it moved for likely non-migrants. This finding is consistent with the increase in tolerance being driven by intergroup contact, which increased sharply among likely migrants but barely moved among likely non-migrants.

Finally, in-depth, semi-structured qualitative interviews with study participants corroborate this interpretation. Subjects who moved abroad wove rich tapestries of experiences with co-workers, employers, and customers belonging to a range of nationalities, religions, and ethnicities. Those in the control group, by contrast, described social experiences that were largely defined by interactions with family members, local friends, and neighbors. Importantly, those who migrated abroad reported encountering little discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, helping explain why intergroup contact for these subjects spurred broad egalitarian shifts in their identities and outlooks.

Taken together, our results provide compelling evidence that labor migration in the global economy facilitates new forms of contact that spark tolerance, internationalism, and cosmopolitanism, without resulting in commensurate increases in nationalism and parochialism. A large body of work that focuses on *native* responses finds that immigration precipitates out-group animosity, inter-ethnic strife, and nationalism (cf. Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). Our results on changes in migrants' consciousness suggest that the composite effects of immigration are more nuanced, and that in the case of labor migrants immigration fosters just the opposite set of outcomes. This study provides the first set of field experimental evidence on how labor mobility in the global economy reshapes the identities and attitudes of migrants, illustrating how globalization holds the potential of altering intergroup relations in the developing world.

2 Background: Migration and its Impact on Natives

Under what conditions does migration lead to greater tolerance, support for internationalism, and identification with cosmopolitan values? As globalization weaves different parts of the world into an interconnected web and facilitates the flow of people and ideas, many have predicted (and hoped) that increased contact with "the other" will spur more tolerance and raise demands for enhanced cooperation across nations. Theoretically, this notion is supported by Allport (1954), which makes the claim that contact between groups can lower prejudice if prejudice stems from false information about outgroups. Despite Allport's (1954) predictions, research on the impact of immigration on tolerance and support for internationalism has been mixed.

The majority of literature on immigration has focused by and large on the experiences of natives in Western Europe and the United States based on their interactions with ethnic minorities, immigrants, and refugees. Contrary to the predictions of contact theory, scholars have shown that living in areas with more immigrants frequently leads to increased intolerance (Fetzer, 2000; Enos, 2014). Context, however, matters: prior experience and meaningful contact with immigrants can result in greater tolerance if economic competition is limited and immigration is not politicized (Fetzer, 2000; McLaren, 2003; Ellison et al., 2011; Steinmayr, 2021; Adida, 2014a).

The impact of migration on tolerance is important because cultural attitudes toward outgroups impact support for international cooperation at-large. Studies have linked greater exposure to immigration to an increase in anti-immigrant and protectionist policies as well as right-wing ethnocentric political parties (Tabellini, 2020; Halla et al., 2017; Dreher et al., 2020). Meaningful and positive interaction between natives and immigrants or natives and refugees, however, can mitigate migration's negative effect on support for internationalism (Steinmayr, 2021; Dustmann et al., 2019; Newman, 2013). Nevertheless, we know relatively little about how migrants' attitudes change in response to migration since most studies have focused on natives' reactions.

The limited work that examines the experiences of long-term immigrants in Western Europe and the U.S. studies reactions to discrimination and forced assimilation in host countries. This literature has shown that when immigrants experience intolerance on the part of natives, they increasingly identify with parochial ethnic, religious, or national groups (Fouka, 2020). At the same time, Abdelgadir and Fouka (2020) demonstrates that the experience of discrimination can lead

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to increased identification with both one's religious identity and the host nation. This raises the possibility that migrants do not necessarily see local, national, and international identification as exclusive of each other. Yet we lack research on how migrants choose from a palette of different identities in response to greater contact with natives and other migrants.

3 How Migration Alters Migrants' Consciousness and Identities

Below we explicate a theory of how the migration experience can shape migrants' tolerance toward other groups and, in turn, their identification with international, national, and local communities. While the weight of the evidence in the immigration literature finds that migration increases inter-group animosity, we also know that the form of migration and its political context matters for attitude formation. First, when migrant groups are more heterogeneous and hence less likely to prioritize any single ethnic, linguistic, religious, national, or partisan identity, it is more likely that migration augments tolerance (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). Second, when there is limited economic competition between migrants and natives, backlash to migration is less likely to foment (Adida, 2014b). When these conditions are met, there is a greater possibility for positive interactions between natives and migrants, resulting in less discrimination against migrants and reducing the likelihood of migrants retreating into ethnic and national identities. Consequently, contact with out-groups should make migrants more tolerant, more supportive of international cooperation, and less likely to retreat into parochial identities.

3.1 Migration, Contact, and Tolerance

We first argue that migration should augment intercultural tolerance through increased contact. Many scholars, most notably Allport (1954), have argued that when prejudices and exclusion rests on false information about other groups, intercultural contact—meeting and working with those of different backgrounds—can change beliefs and, in turn, increase tolerance.[2] Others have suggested that it is social norms about group positions that produce intolerance when hierarchies underpinning these norms are challenged (Blumer, 1958).

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[2]The question of under what conditions contact leads to tolerance has spurred a rich literature investigating Allport's "contact hypothesis." Experimental studies demonstrate that contact does reduce prejudice and improve tolerance in a variety of contexts (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Paluck and Green, 2009; Paluck et al., 2019; Clingingsmith et al., 2009; Mousa, 2020; Scacco and Warren, 2018; Corno et al., 2019; Barnhardt, 2009).

As overseas migration has grown in recent decades, it has become one of the primary ways that individuals encounter individuals from other ethnicities, religions, and nationalities. Does this intercultural contact encourage tolerance or intolerance? A great deal of work, mostly observational, has focused on how the arrival of migrants affects those in immigrant-receiving communities. Many worry that immigration invokes fears about declining cultural majorities (e.g., whites in the west) and, in turn, spurs intolerance and backlash to migration among natives in receiving communities. Some argue that these interactions merely expose intolerance rather than provoke it (Dancygier and Laitin, 2014). Others have suggested that experience with immigration leads to tolerance when it enables meaningful contact between natives and migrants, rather than just exposure (Steinmayr, 2021). Here, even when there are hierarchies among natives and different migrant groups, there is potential for contact to augment tolerance.

There is very little work, however, exploring the other side of these encounters: how migration affects migrants themselves. Migrating to a new country forces individuals to work and live alongside those of different backgrounds, potentially challenging previously held beliefs about these groups. There are good reasons to believe, therefore, that this contact should lead migrants to become more tolerant of other nationalities and cultures. Clingingsmith et al. (2009), for example, shows that Pakistanis randomly selected for a visa to make the *hajj* became more tolerant and more accepting of international migration compared to those who were not selected. It is hard to know, however, whether such a short, once-in-a-lifetime, communal, and spiritual experience generalizes to other types of migration.

Labor migration presents a good case to test whether inter-group contact can increase tolerance—even in societies with rigid hierarchies. Labor migrants interact with a variety of groups in the context of their work. For example, labor migrants typically interact with native born individuals on unequal footings, such as employees with their bosses or servers with customers. On the other hand, living and working together with other migrants is likely to take place on more equal terms. Thus, if hierarchies are important we may expect migrants to become more tolerant toward those groups with which they interact on equal terms and less tolerant toward those with whom they do not. In contrast, if contact challenges previously held beliefs then it should improve tolerance regardless of whether interactions are hierarchical in nature.

We argue that migrants should become more tolerant even when interacting with others in

hierarchical contexts. First, there is evidence that contact can result in lower prejudice in a variety of contexts—hierarchical or not—outside of migration (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). Second, even in migration settings where hierarchies exist between migrants and natives, natives can become more tolerant if they have contact with and not just exposure to migrants. Third, the social norm theory of prejudice is based on group hierarchies that have been built and maintained through long-term contact and exposure. Migrants, however, encounter new groups in the host country that do not fit neatly into home group categories, making it less likely that prejudice would get stronger post-migration. Together, this discussion leads us to propose the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Individuals who migrate internationally for employment should have greater contact with ethnic, cultural, and national outgroups than those who do not.

Hypothesis 2: Individuals who migrate internationally for employment should develop greater tolerance for ethnic, cultural, and national outgroups than those who do not.

3.2 Internationalism

Next, we argue that increased contact with, and tolerance for, other cultures and nationalities should drive migrants to become more supportive of globalization and international cooperation—what scholars define as "internationalism." A growing body of evidence links preferences for international cooperation, particularly in the context of a broader backlash to globalization, to attitudes toward cultural and national outgroups. In international political economy research, many studies show that outgroup hostility and ethnocentrism are key driving forces behind isolationist preferences toward trade and immigration: more educated and tolerant individuals are more supportive of global economic integration (Mansfield and Mutz, 2009; Sabet, 2016; Edwards, 2006; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; Rankin, 2001; Cavaille and Marshall, 2019). Similarly, scholarship in international security has shown that individuals with more tolerant attitudes toward cultural outgroups are also more supportive of international cooperation and less supportive of hawkish foreign policy (Berinsky, 2009; Kinder and Kam, 2011; Kertzer, 2018).

By bringing individuals from diverse cultural and national backgrounds into contact, migration offers an important opportunity for individuals to shift their attitudes toward outgroups and thereby toward cooperative foreign policy. Existing work explores the native-born side of this contact: how

contact with immigrants and refugees shapes support for migration and international cooperation among individuals in receiving communities (Ellison et al., 2011; Enos, 2014; Choi et al., 2019; Steinmayr, 2021). We argue that these effects of contact can go both ways: migrants too are likely to be changed by intercultural interactions. If migrants grow more tolerant of cultural and national outgroups, then they would likely become more supportive of migration, trade, and international security cooperation (Herrmann, 2017; Careja and Emmenegger, 2012).

> **Hypothesis 3:** *Individuals who migrate internationally for employment should grow more supportive of international political and economic cooperation compared to those who do not.*

3.3   Nationalism, Regionalism, and Group Identification

The experience of living abroad may have implications for migrants' support for policies that prioritize the nation state ("nationalism"), ethnicity-based sub-national jurisdictions ("regionalism"), as well as individuals' sense of identification with regional, national and international communities. Attitudinal change with respect to national, religious, and ethnic identification in the context of migration has most closely been linked to host country discrimination by natives (Fouka, 2020; Adida et al., 2014). However, migrants bring with themselves a palette of identities which may or may not produce countervailing identification pressures.

Many migrants come from multi-ethnic societies where potential migrants are members of ethnic minorities.[3] Prior to migration, members of minority groups often define their identity in contrast to majoritarian groups who are seen as synonymous with the idea of the nation. This is more likely when minority groups have "entropy-resistant" traits, which allows majority groups to discriminate against them and minority groups to develop their own (sub-)nationalism (Gellner, 2015). Upon migration, migrants from ethnic minorities can find themselves discriminated against based on their nationality. This may produce different responses from migrants from minority groups.

On the one hand, reactive identity theory suggests that migrants may reaffirm their national identities in response to discrimination in the host country (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001; Rumbaut, 2008). Empirical evidence suggests that minority groups, for example, have reacted to language

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[3]Migration, in fact, is often a strategy for minorities to escape employment discrimination at home (Gaikwad et al., 2022).

or Muslim headscarf bans by further investing in linguistic, national, or religious identities (Fouka, 2020; Abdelgadir and Fouka, 2020). On the other hand, discrimination may also prompt individuals to increase their identification with the majority group (Gómez et al., 2011). In the case of discrimination against migrants, this may result in increased identification with the host society. Migrants, therefore, may associate themselves increasingly with those identities that bring themselves closer to the host society. South Indian Muslims in the Persian Gulf, for example, have come to increasingly adopt Islamic practices of the Gulf and identify with transnational Islam as a consequence of both discrimination in the Gulf for being migrants and for discrimination in India in the context of strengthening Hindu nationalism (Hapke and Ayyankeril, 2018).

Therefore, we remain agnostic on whether the experience of living and working abroad will increase (H4a) or decrease (H4b) nationalism and national identification.[4] This leads us to propose the following hypotheses:

> **Hypothesis 4a:** *Individuals who migrate internationally for employment should be more likely to identify as Indian and more likely to support national integration compared to those who do not.*
>
> **Hypothesis 4b:** *Individuals who migrate internationally for employment should be less likely to identify as Indian and less likely to support national integration compared to those who do not.*

As mentioned earlier, group identification may also develop in the context of a global community, leading migrants to embrace cosmopolitan identities. The literature in political theory provides rich insights into the concept of cosmopolitanism (Benhabib, 2008; Breckenridge, 2002; Fine, 2007). The Stoics developed the idea of the *kosmou politês* or world citizens, "arguing that each of us dwells, in effect, in two communities - the local community of our birth, and the community of human argument and aspiration that 'is truly great and truly common, in which we look neither to this corner nor to that, but measure the boundaries of our nation by the sun' (Seneca, *De Otio*)" (Nussbaum, 1994, 157-158). In this worldview, differences in national, regional, or ethnic membership should not result in individuals erecting barriers with fellow humans outside of their local communities;

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[4]In our empirical tests, beyond ascertaining overall effects, we rely on qualitative interviews to fill out the causal picture and distinguish between these two causal stories.

individuals who embrace cosmopolitan identities put universal reason and the aspirations of all of humanity before symbols of ethnic, regional, or national belonging. Importantly, in addition, embracing cosmopolitanism need not necessitate giving up more parochial identifications. It is our contention, then, that migrants who upon leaving their homelands encounter and grow tolerant of members of other ethnic, religious, and national communities, will become more likely to adopt cosmopolitan identities.

> **Hypothesis 5:** *Individuals who migrate internationally for employment should be more likely to identify as citizens of the world compared to those who do not.*

3.4 Alternative Mechanism: Economic Resources

While we argue that intercultural contact is the primary mechanism by which migration affects outgroup tolerance and international identification, we now engage with an important alternative mechanism: economic resources that stem from migrating overseas.

Working overseas can provide migrants with valuable economic resources, which in turn may alter their consciousness and build support for international cooperation. This may especially be true for labor migrants, who benefit materially from job opportunities overseas and have an increased stake in migration, trade, and international cooperation more generally. Such an argument would also be consistent more generally with the position of workers in lower-income countries, who stand to benefit more from globalization, consistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin model (Rieselbach, 1960; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987). Therefore, it is also possible that migrants become more tolerant and more supportive of international cooperation because of their improved economic station rather than because of increased contact with individuals from different ethnic or national backgrounds.

Beyond labor migrants, scholars on attitudes towards immigration have suggested that views about out-groups and international cooperation are driven by economic resources, rather than cultural attitudes. Educated and wealthier people tend to be more supportive of immigrants—even those with whom they compete in labor markets (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). Congruently, studies find that continued exposure to negative economic shocks and unemployment can foster greater support for authoritarian values, more hostility towards out-groups, and more isolationist attitudes toward migration and trade (Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Sabet, 2016; Ballard-Rosa et al.,

2021). Those who face economic competition from migrants are also more likely to hold hostile attitudes towards immigrants (Adida, 2014a; Malhotra et al., 2013). In this logic, migrants who gain economically through overseas employment are predicted to become more tolerant of out-groups and supportive of international cooperation.

If economic resources were the primary mechanism, we should also expect members of migrants' immediate families to become more tolerant and supportive of international cooperation. These family members benefit materially from remittances and thus have a greater economic stake in international cooperation, but are not exposed to intercultural contact like migrants.

4   Research Design

To test the effect of labor migration on tolerance and international, national, and regional identities, we conducted a randomized controlled trial connecting individuals in Mizoram, India seeking overseas jobs with lucrative employment opportunities in the hospitality industry in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region.[5]

4.1   Setting

We study hospitality-sector labor migration from Mizoram, a state in Northeast India, to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. We chose Mizoram as our study location because international out-migration is rare and local economic opportunities are scarce. Relative to other Indian states, Mizoram is small, isolated, and economically underdeveloped. The vast majority of Mizoram's population are members of Mizo community, an historically marginalized indigenous Scheduled Tribe (ST) community concentrated in Mizoram. Mizos typically encounter few economic opportunities in other parts of India, where they face discrimination as conspicuous racial and religious minorities (McDuie-Ra, 2012). Mizos are generally viewed as racially Southeast Asian (rather than South Asian) and the vast majority are Christians (rather than Hindus or Muslims). This demographic and economic isolation was cemented in the 1980s, when a long-running Mizo separatist movement disarmed in exchange for statehood and strict controls on internal migration. For additional information on our study setting,

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[5]This research design also forms the basis of the design reported in Gaikwad et al. (2022).

see *Appendix A.1.*

This study aimed to evaluate an initiative by the Mizoram government to help Mizos join a large and growing labor migration corridor between India and GCC countries. India is the world's largest source of emigrants (16.6 million per year), who are primarily labor migrants in other Asian countries (United Nations and Social Affairs, 2017). In particular, many Indians work in GCC countries, with the India-UAE corridor representing the second-largest bilateral passageway in the world (United Nations and Social Affairs, 2016). In the GCC countries, there is a substantial demand for foreign workers in service sectors, and workers from South Asia often enjoy advantages due to their high literacy and English-language skills. Notably, labor migrants typically return home after employment stints abroad, as GCC states tend not to have pathways to citizenship for foreign workers or their children.

In the Gulf region labor migrants are exposed to a remarkably diverse community; this is especially true for Mizos, who hail from a religiously and ethnically homogeneous territory. Foreign workers constitute majorities of the populations in GCC countries such as the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar. The UAE is home to nearly three times as many Indian citizens as Emiratis. Indian labor migrants typically live and work alongside others from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and other countries from Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Those working in restaurants and hotels serve a range of customers from all over the world. We provide more detail on these interactions in Section 5.2.

4.2 Sample

In July–August 2018, in collaboration with the Government of Mizoram's Mizoram Youth Commission (MYC) and a local NGO (MZP), we recruited a group of prospective applicants interested in overseas employment from in and around Mizoram's capital city, Aizawl (for additional details, see *Appendix A.2.*). With the help of our recruitment partner (a Mumbai-based recruitment firm, Vira International), we selected candidates from applicants that met basic requirements for hospitality sector jobs in the GCC countries: English language skills and educational attainment.[6] Following selection, a survey firm, Delhi-based CVoter, Inc. surveyed subjects at baseline. Basic

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[6] English is the medium of instruction, apart from Mizo, in Mizoram schools; thus a large proportion of candidates had the required skills.

demographics and pre-treatment outcome measures were recorded (*Appendix A.3* discusses survey methodology).

Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of Subjects

	Baseline	*Endline*
N	389	248
Mean Age (Baseline)	22.9	22.9
Pct Male	56	54
Pct Completed Grade 12	72	75
Pct Employed	14	12
Pct Married	2	1
Pct Scheduled Tribe	95	96

Table 1 shows the baseline characteristics of our sample. The final 392 candidates were by-and-large young, educated, and unemployed. The average age in our sample was 23. More than 70% of participants had completed high school and more than 85% were unemployed at the start of the program. These characteristics are not unusual for South Asian communities with high rates of outmigration to the Gulf.[7] From this pool, half were randomly selected to attend the training and recruitment module (T=196, C=196). Prior to assignment to experimental groups, we used a matching algorithm to generate blocked pairs to ensure balance along key covariates which might predict economic prospects (specifically gender, education, and English proficiency).

4.3 Treatment

Our treatment comprised a two part program that was designed specifically to facilitate migration to the GCC countries for hospitality sector employment.

First, all selected individuals were offered a fully-funded, five-week hospitality training program in Oct-Nov 2018. The training was designed and administered by a Bangalore-based job-training firm (Free Climb, Inc.) in collaboration with a local NGO (SJnDI), which helped host the program. Participants received both classroom and basic practical training for service jobs in restaurants and hotels in the Gulf. This training was not exhaustive; it was primarily designed to enable candidates to interview and demonstrate eligibility for overseas hospitality jobs. Foreign employers,

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[7]Comparisons between our sample and migrants in the Kerala Migration Study, the largest set of surveys of labor migrants in the Global South, reveal two important similarities: migrants are more educated than comparable cohorts of non-migrants and the majority of migrants hail from underrepresented ethno-religious groups.

including all of the employers in our study, provide in-depth job-specific training to hired employees. Additional details of the training program are provided in *Appendix A.4*.

In the second phase of the treatment, candidates in the treatment group were invited for interviews with employers hailing from the hospitality sector in the GCC region. Our recruitment partner connected subjects with a set of vetted potential Gulf employers, ranging from hotels such as Mandarin Oriental to food-and-beverage outlets such as Pizza Hut and Costa Coffee. Employers, in turn, conducted several rounds of interviews with candidates, both remote and in-person, between March and July 2019. Every individual in the treatment group was eligible to interview, typically multiple times, and employers offered jobs to candidates who were deemed to be suitable matches. Employers paid and applied for visas on behalf of job candidates, and our recruitment partner and local project manager assisted candidates in obtaining medical certificates and other paperwork necessary for emigration.

The study by necessity bundled both elements of the treatment: the training program and recruitment opportunities for overseas placement. That said, potential effects of the treatment on tolerance, internationalism, and group identification likely stem from subjects migrating and working overseas rather than simply attending the training program. There are many hospitality job training programs available in Mizoram; many treatment group subjects had previously enrolled in similar programs and over forty percent of control group subjects enrolled in alternate programs.[8] Placement opportunities with foreign employers, by contrast, are few and far between.[9] Additionally, contact between subjects and the training instructors was relatively shallow and short.

4.4   Ethical Considerations

Careful consideration was given to the ethics of this study, which was approved by IRB committees at Columbia University, Stanford University, Dartmouth College, and the US Naval War College, the authors' institutions. While international employment offers otherwise unattainable economic opportunities and has the potential to increase inter-group tolerance, it also poses risks to migrants' physical and psychological wellbeing. There have been reported cases of exploitation

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[8]Within the control group, job training attendance was not associated with a significant increase in tolerance or internationalism—see *Appendix F*.

[9]Only three percent of respondents reported having friends overseas and ten percent of respondents were aware of extended family connections abroad at baseline.

of immigrant workers in GCC countries (Sasikumar and Timothy, 2015). This study was embedded within the Research & Empirical Analysis of Labor Migration Program, which aims to improve empirical knowledge regarding labor migration to the Gulf in order to promote fairer labor mobility processes and better outcomes for migrants and stakeholders. The goal of our project was to evaluate a blueprint for ethical cross-border labor migration, to be used by governments and NGOs in the future. We worked closely with our partners to minimize the potential risks that participants might face, to ensure that the benefits of the program flowed to participants, and to protect participants' informed consent (Teele, 2014; Humphreys, 2015).

We situated the study in Mizoram because of the existing demand for international employment from individuals who lacked local employment opportunities. The Mizoram government, the MYC, and local NGOs were interested in creating overseas job opportunities for Mizoram's unemployed but educated and upwardly mobile population, and called upon academic researchers to assist in the scientific evaluation of the skills training and overseas recruitment programs that were already underway. An additional benefit of the partnership was the creation of a scientific body of evidence regarding the economic and social impacts of labor migration, which we deemed valuable to scholars, policymakers, and migrants in a range of other contexts.

By helping connect government and civic organizations with reputable partners both inside and outside of India, the program enabled local stakeholders to select potential employers and protect citizens staying abroad. We undertook a number of steps to protect program participants: vetted project partners; selected the hospitality sector because it is relatively reputable compared to sectors where labor violations had previously been reported (e.g., construction); screened specific employers for fair recruitment and labor practices; connected would-be migrants with governmental agencies safeguarding migrants' rights; registered employment contracts with regulatory groups; and offered subjects extensive information on risks, rights, and resources. In particular, the program's goal was to improve the recruitment and migration experience for prospective migrants relative to those who migrated on their own accord. Future government initiatives in the region were expected to benefit from the knowledge generated and the connections created. An extended discussion of ethical considerations is provided in *Appendix A.5*. *Appendix A.6* provides a cost-benefit analysis of the intervention, which both serves as an impact evaluation of the program as a conduit for economic development and helps further inform the discussion of ethical considerations by weighing

the benefits for candidates against the costs for researchers.

4.5   Outcomes and Estimation

Details regarding the sample and balance tests are reported in *Appendix B.1*. Our main outcome come from the endline survey that was conducted in January–March 2021. Of the 392 pre-treatment subjects, 248 responded to the endline survey (63%). In a host of statistical tests, we find no evidence of systematic bias resulting from attrition. We also do not find that pre-treatment covariates systematically predict response rates (see *Appendix B.2*). First, multi-sample t-tests show that treatment subjects were not significantly more likely to respond than control subjects. Second, using omnibus F-tests we do not find that pre-treatment covariates (and interactions between covariates and the treatment) predict patterns in attrition. Third, F-tests predicting treatment status by pre-treatment covariates confirm that there are no significant imbalances either among all subjects or among endline respondents. This indicates that coefficient estimates comparing differences between treatment and control respondents are likely to be valid estimates of the treatment effect among respondents, and possibly among non-respondents as well.

We evaluated seven major tolerance and identity-related effects associated with migration corresponding to five pre-registered hypotheses, driven by our theory described earlier. For each outcome, we asked 1-6 survey questions. For multi-question outcomes, we combined various responses with a z-score index of the main outcome in order to reduce the number of comparisons (and therefore the chance of false positives) and to reduce noise.[10] The specific wording and answer choices for these questions are listed in the *Appendix C*. We configured all outcome variables such that the hypothesized direction of the effect is positive and that all effect sizes are in units of standard deviations of the dependent variable.

The main results show the estimated average treatment effect (ATE) for each hypothesis, controlling for the baseline measure of each variable. We obtain our p-values using randomization inference (RI) replicating the randomization procedure 10,000 times to show the range of possible ATE estimates that might occur under the strict null hypothesis. RI helps account for the fact that our randomization procedure (using blocked pairs) restricted the possible variance that could occur.

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[10]Given the multiple main hypotheses, we also provide a Benjamini-Hochberg false discovery rate analysis in *Appendix E*, as specified in the pre-analysis plan. Even by the conservative statistical standards of this analysis, our central findings are validated.

As a robustness check, we also report standard errors from more traditional parametric models (*Appendix D*), with nearly identical results. We pre-registered hypotheses and procedures on the Experiments in Governance and Politics online registry. Consequently, we use one-tailed p-values reflecting the pre-registered effect direction, with the exception of Hypothesis 4 for which we had two competing hypotheses.

We also took a number of steps, detailed in Section 6, to disentangle the possible mechanisms by which our treatment affects tolerance, internationalism, and group identification—all of which were registered in our pre-analysis plan. First, Section 6.1 uses pre-treatment covariates to identify demographic subgroups where migration was likely and compares the effects among likely migrants to the effects among likely non-migrants. This helps to separate the effects of moving abroad from the effects of the training program and the opportunity to migrate. Second, we conducted dozens of qualitative interviews with individuals in both the treatment and control groups who were identified by our algorithm as likely migrants. In Section 6.2, we summarize their experiences overseas and use them to probe the causal mechanisms. Third, we conducted a separate survey of family members of the candidates (one per candidate, most of whom were parents and siblings). These family members benefited from improved economic prospects and resources, but did not have the experience of migrating, living, and working overseas with people from different cultural and national backgrounds, helping us separate the role of alternative economic mechanisms from that of contact (see Section 6.3).

5   Experimental Results

Overall, our findings provide strong evidence that migrating abroad for employment significantly changes migrants' tolerance towards others as well as their own identities. Individuals in the treatment group showed significantly higher levels of intercultural contact, intergroup tolerance, and support for international cooperation. They also started to identify themselves as "citizens of the world." At the same time, they did not increase identification with their national or regional communities.

5.1 First Stage: International Migration

As Figure 1 shows, the first result of note is that our intervention did indeed help our job candidates in the treatment group migrate abroad (Gaikwad et al., 2022). While just 3 percent of the control group moved overseas, the corresponding figure in the treatment group was 23 percent (a 667% proportional increase in migration). Individuals who migrated abroad took jobs in Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Most of these subjects were still living abroad when the endline survey was administered approximately two years later, as shown in Figure 1. Equally notable, however, is that nearly identical proportions of the treatment and control group moved away from Mizoram; the primary difference between both groups was the destination of the migrants. 32 percent of the control group (and 13 percent of the treatment group) moved elsewhere within India for work, mostly to large cities like Kolkata, Mumbai, and Delhi, and states like Goa. This suggests that both control and treatment group individuals had some opportunities to interact with non-Mizos.

Figure 1: Location of Subjects over Time

5.2 Intergroup Contact

We uncover firm evidence, moreover, that migrants established substantially greater contact with individuals from different cultural and national backgrounds. Table 2 and Figure 2 indicate that this was the case. Individuals in the treatment group were almost half a standard deviation more likely to have interacted with people who hailed from different ethno-religious communities and nationalities. The treatment group was significantly more likely to have worked regularly alongside individuals from a different religion (37% vs. 26%), ethnicity (39% vs. 24%) and nationality (26% vs. 8%). These interactions extended to the social sphere, with migrants regularly sharing meals with individuals from different faiths (29% vs. 21%), ethnicities (30% vs. 15%), and nationalities (22% vs. 6%).

Table 2: Results: Intercultural Contact

	Group Means		OLS w/ Baseline		
	Ctrl	*Treat*	*ATE*	*P-Value*	*N*
Contact Index	—	**.481**	**+.487**	**.001*****	**248**
Meal w/ Non-Christian	2.28	2.61	+.34	.031**	248
Meal w/ Non-Mizo	2.18	2.66	+.49	.002***	248
Meal w/ Non-Indian	1.49	2.13	+.64	.000***	247
Work w/ Non-Christian	2.79	2.99	+.20	.131	248
Work w/ Non-Mizo	2.72	2.98	+.27	.070*	248
Work w/ Non-Indian	1.59	2.26	+.67	.000***	247

$*p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01$

Bold rows are z-score indices of component items below, with control mean set at 0 and 1 unit being 1 standard deviation of the DV in the control group. P-values are one sided, as per pre-registered hypothesis. All items are set such that the hypothesized direction (more contact) is positive. All items are measured on a scale from 1 (never) to 5 (daily).

These results are notable given that about a fifth of both the control and treatment group moved outside of Mizoram for work. The experiences of those living overseas versus elsewhere in India, however, appeared to be qualitatively quite different. In interviews, overseas migrants described that one of their defining experiences was living and working together with people from Nepal, the Philippines, Pakistan, Bangladesh, other parts of India, and Egypt for example.[11] This was not the case for those who moved to other parts of India. Mizos living elsewhere in India typically came into

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[11]See Section 6.2 section for more details.

Figure 2: Results: Intergroup Contact

Percentage of treatment and control individuals who have had each type of contact regularly (at least once a week) with each outgroup.

contact with a much less diverse array of people. In fact, they typically lived and worked alongside Mizos and other North-easterners.

5.3 Intergroup Tolerance

Living and working alongside such a diverse array of people conclusively shifted migrants' tolerance for individuals with different ethnic, religious, and national backgrounds, as Table 3 demonstrates. On average, the treatment group scored more than a third of a standard deviation higher on an index of intergroup tolerance compared to the control group. Individuals in the treatment group were 25% more likely to say that it was acceptable to marry a non-Mizo (65% vs 52%) than those in the control group. They were also significantly more likely to give positive impressions of various ethnic and national outgroups on a feeling thermometer: Europeans (3.25 vs

3.14), Bangladeshis (3.08 vs 2.95), Pakistanis (3.01 vs. 2.90), Middle Easterners (3.23 vs 3.01).

Table 3: Results: Intergroup Tolerance

| | Group Means | | OLS w/ Baseline | | |
	Ctrl	Treat	ATE	P-Value	N
Tolerance Index	—	**.371**	**+.354**	**.004*****	**248**
OK to Marry Non-Mizo	.52	.65	+.13	.022**	248
View of Bangladeshis	2.95	3.08	+ .13	.041**	248
View of Pakistanis	2.90	3.01	+ .11	.072*	248
View of Middle Easterners	3.01	3.23	+ .21	.002***	248
View of Europeans	3.14	3.25	+ .11	.045**	248

*p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01

Bold row is a z-score index of component items below, with control mean set at 0 and 1 unit being 1 standard deviation of the DV in the control group. P-values are one sided, as per pre-registered hypothesis. All items are set such that the hypothesized direction (more tolerant) is positive. Items 2-5 are measured on a scale from 1 (very negative) to 5 (very positive).

These effects contribute to scholarly debates on the nature of prejudice and the role of contact in diminishing it. Allport (1954) theorizes that prejudice is driven by false information about outgroups, while others have suggested that prejudice is based on social norms that underpin group hierarchies (Blumer, 1958). Scholars have hypothesized that contact is unlikely to lead to tolerance unless it is cooperative, on equal footing, and endorsed by authorities. In the Gulf hospitality sector, migrant workers are likely to work and live in relatively egalitarian terms alongside other South and Southeast Asians, but are more likely to interact with Middle Easterners and Europeans as servers or employees in hierarchical settings. It does not appear, however, that the treatment effects documented in Table 3 diverge according to the nature of contact: the treatment group's most improved views, for example, were of Middle Easterners, even though migrant workers are excluded from government benefits in the Gulf, depend on Gulf employers to sponsor visas, and have no avenue for citizenship in their host nations. These results suggest that contact itself is the important element, not the horizontal nature of the contact.

5.4 Internationalism

We have shown that migration leads to increased inter-cultural contact as well as tolerance. Here, we examine if the treatment in our study also leads migrants to become more internationalist in

their outlooks: supportive of global economic and security cooperation as well as supportive of more migration. Recall, in line with prior work on immigration, we theorized that more tolerant cultural attitudes should lead to improved support for international cooperation. To test this conjecture, we created two indices: the first captured individuals' support for international economic integration and security cooperation, and the second measured individuals' support for migration as well as specifically migration into Mizoram from neighboring Bangladesh. Since we included these questions in both our endline and midline surveys, we can track the evolution of migrants' views on these issues both post-training/pre-migration and post-migration.

Table 4 summarizes these findings, demonstrating strong support for Hypothesis 3. Those in the treatment group were 0.231 standard deviation more supportive of international economic and political cooperation. At endline, the treatment group was more likely to agree with the statement that trade improves lives (4.27 vs 4.04 on 1-5 scale) and that peace with Pakistan is important (3.98 vs 3.87). Additionally, we find that the treatment led subjects to evidence more interest in international politics and affairs. However, we do not find that the treatment elicits stronger support for permissive migration policies that would facilitate more in-migration to Mizoram from neighboring Bangladesh (flows that have historically generated pronounced anti-migrant movements in the state). Respondents in the treatment group were neither more nor less likely to agree that migration improves lives (3.47 vs 3.39) and to support Bangladeshi migration into India (2.77 vs. 2.66). This suggests that there are potential limits on the tolerance-inducing impact of migration.

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Table 4: Results: Support for International Cooperation

	Group Means		OLS w/ Baseline		
	Ctrl	*Treat*	*ATE*	*P-Value*	*N*
Intl Cooperation Index	—	**.231**	**+ .231**	**.038****	**248**
Trade Improves Lives	4.04	4.27	+ .23	.023**	248
Peace w/ Pakistan is Important	3.87	3.98	+ .12	.179	248
Migration Index	—	**.125**	**+ .123**	**.161**	**248**
Migration Improves Lives	3.39	3.47	+ .08	.278	248
Support Bangladeshi Migration	2.66	2.78	+ .11	.198	248
Interest in Intl Politics	—	**.212**	**+ .211**	**.066***	**248**
Identify as World Citizen	**.14**	**.23**	**+.10**	**.025****	**247**

$*p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01$

Bold rows are z-score indices of items below, with control mean=0 and SD=1. P-values are one sided, as per pre-registered hypothesis. All items are set such that the hypothesized direction (more internationalist views) is positive. All items are measured on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

Importantly, we find no treatment effects on these outcomes when subjects were evaluated at midline, after the training program but prior to migration commencing. This suggests that any possible optimism about migration after selection into the program did not result in increased support for international cooperation. Instead, it appears that the treatment group had to experience new cultures, institutions, and interpersonal interactions after migrating to their host countries before they changed their views on foreign policies. This finding contributes to prior research showing that even temporary contact with different cultural groups can boost support for international peace and cooperation (Clingingsmith et al., 2009).

5.5 Nationalism and Regionalism

Next, we study whether international migration shifted migrants' identification with national and local communities. This may be the case if migrants encounter discrimination based on their national or ethnic profiles in foreign lands, leading them to assert and retreat into narrower conceptualizations of self. Alternatively, as migrants from particular regional communities interact more with co-nationals (here, Mizos with mainland Indians), they may shift their locus of identification from local to more national groups. It is also possible that contact with international communities and lived experiences abroad augments feelings of cosmopolitanism and dampens identification

with more parochial communities, although as we theorized earlier identities are not necessarily constructed in a zero-sum manner. Given these competing possibilities, ex ante we did not have strong predictions about the ways in which international migration can impact identification with one's nation and region/ethncity, and hence we pre-specified two-sided tests for these claims.

Overall, we do not find evidence that our treatment altered subjects' identification with national or regional groups. Table 5 shows that the effect of the treatment on the nationalism index is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Migration did not also meaningfully alter subjects' opinions about whether Mizoram, with its long history of separatist movements, should integrate further into India or whether the government should pass policies to allow mainland Indians to move into the state. These results are noteworthy because we do uncover effects of migration on subjects' evaluations of mainland Indians (treatment group subjects were more tolerant of mainland Indians than control group subjects) and subjects' interest in national-level politics (the treatment led individuals to become more interested in national politics), in line with what might have been expected based on our earlier results on contact, tolerance, and political interest. Evidently, however, while outgroup tolerance and political interest increased, identification with the nation or region remained virtually unchanged.

Table 5: Results: Support for National Integration

	Group Means		OLS w/ Baseline		
	Ctrl	*Treat*	*ATE*	*P-Value*	*N*
Identify more as Indian than as Mizo	2.26	2.17	− .09	.532	247
View of Mainland Indians	3.22	3.39	+ .17	.017**	248
Mizoram should be less Autonomous	2.93	3.04	+ .11	.487	248
OK with Indians moving to Mizoram	1.92	2.09	+ .16	.250	248
Interest in National Politics	1.66	1.84	+ .18	.015**	248

*$p < .1$, **$p < .05$, ***$p < .01$

P-values are two sided, as the hypothesized direction of the effect was left open in pre-analysis plan. Items 1-4 are measured from 1 (Strongly Disagree or Very Negative) to 5 (Strongly Agree or Very Positive). Item 5 is measured from 1 (not at all interested) to 3 (very interested). Bold row presents results of our primary hypothesis, whereas other rows present results of our secondary hypotheses.

Given that much of the literature has linked increased national or ethnic identification amongst immigrants to experiences of discrimination in host societies (Fouka, 2020; Adida et al., 2014), it is

plausible that the lack of changes in identification that we observe in this area is a consequence of migrants in our study not experiencing ethnic or national discrimination while living abroad. This is indeed what we find in our qualitative investigation, unpacked in greater detail in Section 6.2.

5.6 Migration and Cosmopolitan Group Identification

We have thus far presented evidence that cross-border labor migration resulted in increased contact with various types of outgroup communities, augmented tolerance toward members of other ethno-religious and national communities, and heightened perceptions of internationalism. Migration did not, however, lead subjects to embrace nationalism or regionalism. We now present the results of our primary pre-specified hypothesis: that the process of migrating overseas leads individuals to develop more cosmopolitan identities.

We asked migrants about the group with which they most closely identify. Our prediction was that increased contact with, and tolerance of, out-groups would lead migrants to begin identifying with the category, "citizen of the world." Figure 3 graphs the results of this exercise, depicting changes in group identification across the treatment and control groups. We find that members of the treatment group were much more likely than members of the control group to adopt a cosmopolitan identity (23% vs. 14%).[12] Interestingly, this embracing of a cosmopolitan identity did not come at the expense of national or ethnic/regional (Mizo) identities, in line with arguments of the Stoics in ancient political thought (Nussbaum, 1994, 158). Overall, this finding lends credence to the claim that contact with other groups in the wake of migration shifts not only cultural attitudes, tolerance toward outgroups, and support for internationalism, but also core ways in which individuals construct their identities to reflect global aspirations and affiliations.

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[12]This difference is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.025.

Figure 3: Changes in Identity

Respondents were asked which identity they most identify as. For nearly every respondent, any of the five would correctly describe them. Hypothesis was that treatment individuals would be more likely to identify primarily as a "citizen of the world," which was true and statistically significant at a $p < .05$ level.

6 Mechanism Tests

We have argued that migration fostered tolerance, support for international cooperation, and cosmopolitanism due to migrants' experiences living and working abroad alongside those of different cultures. Here, we distinguish this mechanism from two others: first, that the training program itself shifted migrants' views; and second, that migrants' economic gains made them more supportive of international cooperation. All of the mechanism tests reported below were pre-registered.

6.1 Comparing "Likely Migrants" vs. "Likely Non-Migrants"

First, we scrutinize whether the changes in tolerance and policy views were registered among our entire treatment group or just among those who migrated abroad. It is possible, for example, that the experience of a job training program conducted by non-Mizos, or even the gratitude for being selected, might influence the attitudes of respondents even if they decided not to migrate.

In order to distinguish between these effects, we compared the main attitudinal effects of the treatment among individuals who had a high chance of moving abroad to the same effects among

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those who were unlikely to emigrate. To identify these two groups, we conducted two steps prior to the endline survey, using a machine-learning algorithm called Bayesian Additive Regression Trees (BART). First, we used pre-treatment covariates to predict who in the treatment group was likely to use the program to find work abroad and to migrate (using our recruitment partner's records). Second, we used these predictors to identify which individuals in both the treatment and control groups resembled those "compliers." This resulted in a pool of "likely movers" – people who would be highly likely to move abroad if given the opportunity. This procedure is similar to matching compliers in the treatment group to observably similar individuals in the control group, except that it also includes other similar-looking individuals in the treatment group, sidestepping concerns about comparing realized compliers in the treatment group to predicted compliers in the control group. The lists of likely movers and likely non-movers were created before the endline survey and the code was pre-registered. By testing the heterogeneous effects of the treatment among likely movers and likely non-movers, we can help distinguish which effects are due to moving abroad (which the likely movers experienced) versus due to merely joining the job training program (which most of the likely non-movers experienced as well).

Table 6: Main Effects: Likely Migrants vs. Likely Non-Migrants

| | Effect Size | | |
	Migrants	Non-Migrants	Difference?
Moved Abroad	+ .59***	+ .06*	$p < .01$
Intergroup Contact	+ 1.36***	+ .18	$p < .01$
Intergroup Tolerance	+ .87***	+ .16	$p < .05$
Support for Intl Cooperation	+ .25	+ .21*	$p > .1$
Support for Intl Migration	+ .36*	+ .03	$p > .1$
Interest in Intl Politics	+ .50**	+ .09	$p > .1$
Identify as World Citizen	+ .03	+ .13**	$p > .1$
N	68	180	

Each row comes from an OLS regression of treatment (with an interaction term by respondent group) on the main outcome. P-values are two-sided, as there was no pre-registered hypothesis on the difference in effect.

Table 6 compares the main effects among likely movers and likely non-movers and tests the null hypothesis that the two groups' effects are identical. The most important takeaway from this exercise is that the key effects are much larger among those who were likely to migrate as a result of

the treatment than among those who were unlikely to migrate. The index of intergroup tolerance, for example, moved nearly a full standard deviation for the likely migrants, five times as much as it moved for the likely non-migrants. This is consistent with the increase in tolerance being driven by intergroup contact, which increased markedly among the likely migrants and barely at all among the likely non-migrants. The evidence is less clear on how the treatment shaped policy preferences: the differences are small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. This is primarily due to the low statistical power in the tests: smaller treatment effects are harder to distinguish from one another.

These differences are further corroborated by observationally comparing changes over time among different groups in the study. Individuals who moved overseas saw a significant increase in measures of tolerance, while those who migrated within India and those who remained in Mizoram saw no significant change (see *Appendix F*).

6.2 Qualitative Evidence on Contact & Tolerance

Second, evidence from qualitative interviews in both the treatment and control groups demonstrates how migrants' increased contact with a diverse set of ethnic and cultural groups shifted their attitudes. Moreover, migrants discussed limited or no experience with nationality, race, or ethnicity-based discrimination abroad which helps illuminate why we do not uncover increased identification with their own nationality or ethnic group.

Interviewees who lived abroad described having co-workers from "the Philippines, Indonesia and Nepal," "a roommate from Odisha, and [another who] was Manipuri," and "being close with people from other parts of India and Nepal and Bhutan."[13] These were not superficial relationships. One respondent described making friends with his colleagues from the Phillipines because of their similarity to Mizos in culture and appearance:

> "I was comfortable with people from the Philippines because of our similarity in our looks, our physical appearance and they were broad-minded as compared to the others. And also as they were Christian and our lifestyle are somehow similar as compared to people from other places. Initially I was not very close with them but as I get to know them more and spend more time with them, I feel comfortable and I was close to them more than the other employees who were Indian. There were new comers from Arabia and Africa who joined after us, I am also close to these people and we are still in contact."[14]

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[13]Respondents # 179, 144, 44.
[14]Respondent # 156.

Another respondent described that "[she has] made a best friend who is from Bhutan and [their] friendship is very good and strong,"[15] while someone else said that "[there was] one girl from [the] Philippines who was like an elder sister to [her]."[16] Participants who have migrated abroad, therefore, not only met individuals from different cultures, but also forged strong relationships with them as they lived and worked alongside them. For additional evidence on treatment group contact, see Appendix Table A.20.

Figure 4: Description of With Whom Interviewees Spent Time

(a) Treatment Group

(b) Control Group

Increased interactions with people outside of their own ethnic and religious groups was a salient feature of the migration experience. This is illustrated in Figure 4, which charts the word clouds of terms used by the treatment and control groups when responding to the question: "Who are the people you interact with regularly? How would you describe your relationship with them?" While many in the treatment group reflected on relationships with "workers" and "roommates" who tended to be "Filipino," "Indian," and "Nepali" (alongside stressing concepts related to "teamwork," "manager," and "contact"), most of the control group respondents discussed their relationships with their "family," "friends," and "neighbours" that were perpetuated "nearby" in the "locality." Appendix

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[15]Respondent #360.
[16]Respondent # 144.

Table A.21 shows a list of control group quotes.

The qualitative interviews provide evidence that respondents experienced diversity as a positive feature of life in the Gulf and they attributed the lack of racism in these countries directly to diversity. First, when asked what they liked or disliked about living in the Gulf, several of the migrants remarked on the cultural diversity they encountered: "I like every part of staying in that country because I was able to meet people from different countries."[17] Another respondent told us that diversity was one of the most exciting aspects of living abroad: "The fact that I am in a country I never thought I will get the chance to visit is memorable and meeting people from different cultures and religions is also memorable."[18] Second, 10 out of the 19 treatment group members who were interviewed attributed more tolerant attitudes in the Gulf towards people of different races and ethnicities to the existing diversity there. This was summarized by one of the respondents: "here the local people are not racist towards any group of people and also because so many of us here are from different countries, we are more accepting."[19] That is, migrants did not only interact more with out-groups, but they also considered these interactions to be one of the most positive aspects of their experiences abroad. Other quotes on diversity are listed in Appendix Table A.22.

Increased contact with different groups abroad contributed to changing perceptions of outgroups, in line with our theory. Many respondents focused on their changed perceptions of people in the Gulf. One respondent explained to us how she had changed: "I was actually a bit scared because I used to wonder if it is safe to say that I am a Christian because most of them are Muslims, but it is totally opposite of that, no one is bothered that I'm a Christian so no one here is really bothered about religion. And the fact that there is no alcohol and drugs makes it very safe to live."[20] Other examples are listed in Appendix Table A.23. Together, migrants' reflections on forging new relationships with people from abroad and developing an appreciation for diversity illuminate why our experimental results uncovered such strong positive shifts in migrants' levels of tolerance for outgroups.

The qualitative evidence also provides some clues about why we find a limited effect of migration on nationalism. Prior literature on immigrant identity has highlighted experiences with

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[17]Respondent # 156.
[18]Respondent # 261.
[19]Respondent # 59.
[20]Respondent # 40.

discrimination in the host country as one of the main reasons for increased identification with immigrants' own national, ethnic, or religious groups. When asked about discrimination based on race or ethnicity, most migrants told us that "[they] haven't faced any racism here and [they] don't think there is favouritism between races."[21] Others concurred by stating that "because in Dubai we are a mix of people from different countries and people are exposed to that difference in culture so no one is racist here."[22] Migrants' perceptions of limited discrimination based on race did not mean that the Gulf was free of all kinds of discrimination, in respondents' views. Indeed, our interviewees compared the relatively class-based egalitarian society of Mizoram with the stark differences between the rich and poor in the Gulf. When asked which aspects of living in the Middle East they disliked, some of the migrants cited inequality: "Yes, there is a lot of difference between the rich and the poor and even among themselves, the difference was very visible and the rich people mostly look down on the poor ones so I do not like that."[23] In spite of the negative experience with inequality, almost all migrants considered the Gulf to be less discriminatory than mainland India. Migrants' lack of experience with racial discrimination therefore explains why they did not retreat to more parochial identities and instead became more internationalist and cosmopolitan in their worldviews.

6.3   Effects on Family Members

Third, we ask whether migrants' views changed because of the economic benefits of living and working abroad rather than the actual experiences of interacting with outgroup communities. Many studies have shown that individuals with higher incomes and more wealth—particularly those who stand to benefit from globalization—are more tolerant toward out-groups and more supportive of international cooperation. The jobs offered by our program, therefore, may have made individuals in the treatment group more tolerant merely through economic channels. If this were the case, we should expect migrants' immediate family members, who were interviewed in a separate survey, to shift their views as well. These parents and siblings benefited economically from remittances (on average, migrants each sent their families nearly 130,000 INR, or 1,700 USD, in their first year overseas), but did not experience life abroad as their migrant family members did.

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[21]Respondent # 60.
[22]Respondent #261
[23]Respondent #140.

Table 7: Results: Household Members

| | Group Means | | OLS w/ Baseline | | |
	Ctrl	Treat	ATE	P-Value	N
Secondhand Contact	—	+.076	+.077	.268	301
Intercultural Tolerance	—	−.045	−.054	.698	304
Support for International Cooperation	—	−.134	−.119	.844	304

*$p < .1$, **$p < .05$, ***$p < .01$

All three rows are z-score indices of multiple items (full results in Appendix).

Table 7 displays the main results of this analysis, the equivalents of Hypotheses 2-3, but for migrants' family members. Overall, the results are generally close to zero and statistically insignificant: individuals whose children or siblings were selected for the program were no more tolerant or supportive of migration than those whose children or siblings were not.

7   Discussion

We conclude by discussing several features of our study and implications of our findings.

Scope Conditions and External Validity   First, we note potential scope conditions of our results related to the impact of migration on tolerance and identity. This study focused on the impact of a particular kind of migration—employment-based migration—on individuals' consciousness. Labor migration necessitates interaction between migrants and a diverse range of other individuals in regularized and professionalized settings that likely foster cooperative forms of contact. Additionally, the heterogeneous nature of the migrant labor population likely reduced the possibility of integroup conflict, in line with prior literature (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014).

How our results travel to other forms of cross-border migration, such as family-based migration or politically-induced migration (e.g., refugees or asylum seekers), where opportunities to interact with host society groups may be more limited, is an open area of scholarly inquiry. Even within the context of labor migration, sectoral and occupational differences potentially result in varying forms of migrant-native contact, and by implication, tolerance outcomes. Employment that requires workers to routinely interact with others—such as in the hospitality, health, legal, or financial sectors, among others—might be more conducive to inculcating out-group tolerance compared to employment in

sectors that are less social (e.g., household help).

The degree of economic competition between migrants and natives also potentially mediates the development of tolerance norms. Analyzing *native* responses to in-migration in advanced industrialized economies in Western Europe and the United States, scholars have cited labor market competition (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001), fiscal burdens (Hanson et al., 2007), and socio-tropic concerns about the impact of migration on the broader economy (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Alesina and Tabellini 2020, see also Malhotra et al. 2013) as triggers of anti-immigrant attitudes. In the context of some forms of South-South migration, the degree of economic competition has also been shown to be an important mediating variable for immigrant exclusion (Adida, 2014b). But many South-South labor migration flows target labor scarce economies—such as those of the Persian Gulf, Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong Kong—through state-sponsored policies that explicitly attract migrants. The relative absence of migrant-native economic competition in these settings potentially creates fertile ground for the development of intercultural tolerance.

Discrimination Importantly, we find that subjects in our study who migrated reported not perceiving discrimination based on racial, religious or other identity-related terms in their host societies, and many perceived discrimination to be much greater in mainland India than in the Gulf. This may help explain why we observe salutary changes in levels of tolerance and support for international cooperation among subjects who migrated abroad and do not find evidence that migrants retreated into more nationalistic, regional or parochial identities. That said, ethnographic studies point to the multiplex problems and challenges that migrants face in migrant-receiving regions of the Gulf by virtue of their position as non-citizens (Gardner, 2010). How should we interpret our findings in light of extant work? Our qualitative results are instructive in this regard. While migrants in our study repeatedly emphasized the lack of ethnicity-based discrimination in their experiences abroad, they noted other forms of class-based exclusion along the rich-poor divide. This development of class-based consciousness is in line with work that highlights the trade-offs that individuals face between identifying with their ethnicity and class (Corstange, 2013). Migrants' interpretation of their own experience is significant because in response to economic factors it is possible that migrants alter their own attitudes towards economic policy—such as, for example, preferences toward taxation and redistribution (Gaikwad et al., 2022)—rather than their degree of

identification with their nation, region, or ethnic groups.

Identity   Our results on the impact of migration on individuals' identities raise a productive set of questions regarding the contexts in and levels at which individuals choose to self-identify with particular communities, whether "imagined" national communities or more parochial local and ethnic communities (Gellner, 2015; Anderson, 2006) or—as we show here—as members of an international society (Benhabib, 2008). Individuals hold identities that are multilayered and nested. In our study context, subjects were simultaneously Mizo, Scheduled Tribe, Christian, Northeast Indian, Indian, and South Asian. Which identity they chose to embrace was likely a product of the "out-group" they considered to be most salient before and after international migration. It is noteworthy that out-migration led subjects to identify more as "citizens of the world" and less as members of localities while largely leaving untouched their identities as Mizos and Indians.

Contact with members of out-groups appears to be an important contextual variable driving this finding. Migrants in our study reported working and living alongside individuals hailing from a broad range of nationalities across Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Routinized interactions with members of these diverse communities likely reduced the "distance" (Shayo 2010) that Mizos perceived across groups. Thus, identification with the global community should be interpreted in light of the increases in tolerance registered toward members of out-groups among migrants in our sample. The lack of commensurate shifts in tolerance and identification among the household members of migrants, who registered substantial economic gains through remittances, indicates that contact rather than material change is the primary mechanism by which individuals develop tolerance toward out-groups and in turn establish their sense of group-based identities.

In conclusion, this paper offers causal evidence from the first field experiment to have resulted in international migration to show how mobility across borders spurs inter-group tolerance, perceptions of internationalism, and norms of cosmopolitanism among those who move. These findings run contrary to the immigration literature that has studied *native* attitudes and found that migration engenders out-group animosity, nativism, and jingoism. Our findings indicate that the composite effects of immigration are therefore more nuanced than previously believed, opening new lines of inquiry into how human migratory patterns in the global economy reshape social and political relations among members of groups exposed to migration.

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Supporting Information

A   Additional Information about the Project

A.1   Intervention Location and Study Context

Figure A.1: Map of Mizoram, India

Mizoram is situated in northeastern India, bordering Bangladesh from the east and Myanmar from the west. The state is sparsely populated, with around one million residents. Aizawl, the capital city, hosts a third of this population with 300,000 residents. Mizoram has a highly educated population: the literacy rate is 91.33 percent according to the 2011 Census. Female literacy is 89.27 percent, which puts Mizoram amongst the highest literacy and female literacy rates in India (Census 2011). Mizoram also has one of the highest female-to-male demographic ratios as well as one of the lowest literacy gender gaps in the country (Census 2011). While most people in Mizoram speak the local language, Mizo, English is also widely spoken and used as the other official language of the state. The vast majority of the state's population belong to various tribes that are collectively known as Mizos. These tribes have been classified under the Indian Constitution as Scheduled Tribes, a category indicating groups that have been historically marginalized and discriminated. Today, the Indian Constitution guarantees Scheduled Tribes quotas in government jobs, educational institutions, as well as elected positions. The majority of Mizos identify as Christians and only a small minority identifies as Hindus or Buddhists.

Mizos migrated to current Mizoram from upper Burma sometime between the 15th and 18th centuries. British colonization was formalized in 1895 after the Lushai Hills were declared to be part of British India. Mizoram administratively became a district of the province of Assam. This was also the time when Christian missionaries arrived to the area and set up schools. Missionaries

achieved wide-reaching changes in Mizo society by converting the majority of the population to Christianity, opening schools, and educating the masses. After India's independence, Mizoram remained a part of Assam state, but centralized control from Assam frustrated Mizos and in the 1960s the Mizo National Front (MNF) started an armed insurgency. Mizoram became the 23rd state of India in 1986, following a peace accord between the Government of India and the MNF.

Subsequently, the MNF reformed itself as a political party and contested elections in 1987. The Indian National Congress (INC)—established in 1961—is the other major political party in the state. The INC and the MNF have regularly alternated in power in the state's legislative assembly. At the local level, after the abolition of chieftainship, village councils were established in 1957. Mizoram, as a Sixth Schedule state, is excluded from quotas instituted for women, Scheduled Castes, and Other Backward Classes (OBCs), in village councils under the 73rd amendment of the Indian constitution.

Despite its high human capital, Mizoram lacks employment opportunities. The relative geographic isolation and mountainous topography have constrained industrial growth and produced high unemployment rates. Mizoram's GDP per capita is around US$1,600, which puts it at 19th amongst 27 Indian states (Institute for Human Development, 2013). The majority of the population remains employed in agriculture, even though the contribution of agriculture to GDP has been declining (Institute for Human Development, 2013). Industrial output is only 19.39 percent of the state's GDP, whereas the tertiary sector makes up 66.29 percent of the GDP. The largest employer within the services sector, however, remains the government. Taken together, Mizoram has struggled to create employment opportunities outside of small-scale agriculture and the public sector, which leaves its educated population without adequate employment opportunities.

Why focus on the India - GCC migration corridor? Much of prior research on migration has analyzed population flows from the Global South to the North, but migration across countries in the Global South has increased exponentially in the past twenty years. According to the 2017 United Nations Migration Report, migrants around the world are most likely to originate from Asia, which sends 41 percent of the world's migrant population (United Nations and Social Affairs, 2017). India alone sends 16.6 million migrants abroad making it the country with the largest number of emigrants in absolute terms. Furthermore, Sasikumar and Timothy (2015) estimate that there are around 600,000 - 800,000 annual migrants from India, whereas annually India adds 7 - 8 million new workers to the labor force. This makes out-migration one of the major sources of new employment for Indian workers.

Due to the role of economic incentives, social networks and immigration policy regimes, migrants often end up in a small set of countries. Around 60 percent of Asian migrants, for instance, migrate to another Asian country, and only a much smaller subset, 16 and 19 percent migrate to Europe and North America, respectively.[24] Moreover, the 2017 United Nations Migration Report estimates that more than 67 percent of the world's migrant population live in only twenty countries. Out of these twenty, Saudi Arabia has the second largest migrant population, the United Arab Emirates the eighth and Kuwait the twentieth. This has not always been the case. Countries outside of a small group of Western industrialized countries have been registering rapid growth in migrant populations only in the past twenty years (United Nations, 2017). GCC countries are amongst the world's most significant migrant destinations today both in terms of volume and growth in migration.

When looking at migration flows between countries, Indian migration to the UAE is second only to the Mexico-US migration corridor. However, migration between India and the Gulf is growing much more rapidly. Migration between India and the UAE registered almost a three-fold increase and migration from India to Saudi Arabia doubled in the past twenty years.

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[24]In absolute terms this means that out of 105 million Asian migrants in 2017, 63 million migrated within Asia, 20 million migrated to Europe and 17 million to North America.

It is not only the size of migration within the Global South that warrants scholarly and policy attention, but also its economic impact. India is the largest recipient of overseas migrants' remittances, with US$78.6 billion received in 2018 (The World Bank, 2018). For comparison, India received US$44.37 billion in foreign direct investment. Over half of these remittances are sent from GCC countries by Indian migrants. For low or middle income countries the size of these remittances often make up a significant portion of the economy. For India's northeastern neighbor, Nepal, remittances equal 28 percent of its gross domestic product (The World Bank, 2018). Unlike development assistance, remittances flow directly to recipient households making it an important source for consumption and investment.

An important difference between South-South migration and South-North migration is that many Western industrialized countries offer a route to citizenship, although they restrict labor migration flows tightly and often privilege educated and skilled migrants in the case of employment-based immigration (Peters, 2017). By contrast, countries in the Global South usually welcome labor migrants of varying skill levels, but make it very difficult for newcomers to obtain citizenship and permanent residency status.

A.2 Recruitment Strategy

We identified and recruited a group of prospective candidates interested in migrating to GCC countries for employment, but lacking the know-how and connections to do so. We relied on a variety of different media to advertise the job training and placement opportunity. We posted advertisements in leading Mizo newspapers as well as on local Mizo television networks (specifically, Zonet and LPS). We sent recruitment materials and application forms to regional offices of local skills training organizations and visited job fairs organized by the government. One of the job fairs took place in a suburb of Aizawl, while the other one in a neighboring district's headquarter. Additionally, we placed banners around Aizawl advertising the program. Finally, we reached out to the largest Mizo community organization, Mizo Zirlai Pawl (MZP) to advertise on their social media platforms. Advertisement materials were translated to Mizo to reach a wide audience. The advertisement period lasted for two months over the summer of 2018. While we targeted the entire state of Mizoram with our advertising strategy, the majority of applicants came from Aizawl, which was unsurprising given the higher educational attainment and English skills in the capital city.

All our advertising materials asked applicants to be above the age of 18 and have at least Grade 10 standard education. We also required English competency. Once registration for the program took place, our team in Aizawl called back all registered applicants and screened them for their English skills over the phone.

We randomly assigned treatment status using the final list of applicants who passed the English language screening. We matched these applicants into blocked pairs based on age, gender, education level, and English proficiency (judged in the English screening). We then randomized between each pair, assigning one to treatment and the other to control.

3

A.3   Survey Methodology

We were interested in examining the prospective effects of economic opportunity, as distinct from the effects of realized economic gains as well as the effects of migrating abroad, on our theoretical outcome variables of interest. Therefore, we interviewed subjects (both treatment and control) in two survey rounds: a baseline survey before participants were selected for the treatment, and an endline survey after the training program but before individuals secured jobs and began migrating abroad.

Both surveys were administered by a New Delhi-based survey company (CVoter Inc.), that hired twenty local, Mizo-speaking enumerators of both genders to conduct the surveys. This ensured that participants had access to enumerators of the same gender. Both surveys were written in English and then translated and back translated by CVoter's team into Mizo. We offered subjects the choice of Mizo and English versions of the survey. The topics that formed the basis of our surveys are socio-political topics that are routinely discussed in Indian society and that are identical or similar to questions that are commonly asked in many types of preexisting surveys, including government surveys (notably National Family and Health Surveys) carried out across India on a regular basis.

The baseline survey was a face-to-face survey that took place in Aizawl. Survey subjects were invited to the research team's offices in central Aizawl, where they were asked to fill out a survey by enumerators using handheld tablets. In order to facilitate re-contacting, we collected the phone numbers and addresses of each respondent as well as a back-up family member. Shortly after the baseline survey, we contacted our respondents via phone to ensure that appropriate contact information had been given and to verify respondents' willingness to participate in future surveys.

After our training sessions were concluded, we fielded our second survey round. The survey was administered as a 30-minute computer assisted telephone interviews (CATI) by CVoter enumerators. To boost participation, we offered phone credits worth a month of free calls, text messages, and 1 GB data to participants for taking the survey.[25]

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[25] Depending on the telephone operator, this cost around INR 169-199 (USD 2.36-2.78).

A.4 Job Training Program and Participants

In this section, we provide further details regarding the treatment component related to the intensive training program geared toward employment opportunities abroad. The training program was designed to equip individuals with the skills required to access employment opportunities overseas and overcome logistical barriers to migration. Individuals selected for the program had the opportunity to attend a five-week job training program designed to impart skills that would be useful in hospitality sector employment in GCC countries. Individuals were also informed that upon completion of the program, they would be contacted for employment opportunities by a recruitment firm partnering with the training program.

During the first half of the program, participants attended classroom training sessions, administered by a Bangalore-based training firm, Free Climb. This component of the program included modules on restaurant food service, beverage and counter service, and housekeeping. Specifically, the training sessions included instructions on food production (e.g., food safety, knife skills, cooking methods, kitchen equipment handling and maintenance), beverage production (e.g., beverage equipment handling, inventory and storage principles, cleaning schedules, safety and accident prevention), counter services (e.g., customer interaction, communication, order-taking principles, cash register control, cleanliness and hygiene), casual dining service (e.g., table set-up, communication, billing standards and cash control, handling of complaints, food handling principles), and housekeeping (e.g., making of beds, cleaning of guest rooms and baths, re-stocking of guest amenities, handling special requests, managing household equipment), among others. Students attended class five days a week for six hours a day.

In the second half of the program, participants conducted on-the-job training in hotels, restaurants, and fast food chains in Aizawl. Overall, this part of the intervention was designed to upgrade candidates' skills, equipping them with basic knowledge required to demonstrate eligibility for hospitality-sector job opportunities in international destinations at the interview stage. Concurrently, instructors also helped participants prepare resumés and work on interview skills. Resume formats and interview preparations were designed with the input of our Mumbai-based recruitment firm, Vira International, to ensure that participants' job application materials were consistent with GCC hiring standards. To prepare participants for integration into the GCC countries, instructors also provided them with information on regulations and resources abroad. The focus on preparing students for jobs abroad distinguished the training program from other skills training initiatives that were geared toward domestic employment opportunities. Upon completion of the training session, participants were given a course completion certificate.

Figure A.2: Photos of Training Program and Participants

A.5 Ethical Considerations

While international employment offers otherwise unattainable economic opportunities for many immigrants, it potentially poses certain costs and risks to their physical or psychological wellbeing. Labor migrants sometimes struggle to integrate into new political and social environments. Relocating for work, especially overseas, requires navigating a complex, often uncertain set of costs and benefits. International employment can be lucrative but it also requires migration-specific knowledge that is difficult to obtain. This explains why individuals who could gain the most from migration often do not migrate (Bryan et al., 2014). Specifically, in the context of GCC countries, there have been documented instances of migrants facing extortion by recruitment agencies that charge illegal recruitment fees (Sasikumar and Timothy, 2015). Furthermore, Gulf countries have also faced criticism for overlooking employer exploitation, such as the withholding of workers' passports or employers' reneging on promised salaries (Human Rights Watch, 2019). Reports of labor code violations have been concentrated in the construction sector; domestic household workers have also experienced exploitation (Human Rights Watch, 2019).

This study was conceptualized and embedded within [Omnibus Research Program Name Redacted]: "[Omnibus Research Program Name Redacted] aims to shed light on the processes that sustain unfair migrant labor by improving our empirical understanding of the structures and dynamics implicated in recruitment for temporary work in the Gulf region (and, where relevant, elsewhere)." [Omnibus Research Program Name Redacted] was founded in order to generate scientific knowledge regarding labor migration as a way to remedy labor recruitment practices in the Persian Gulf that are often private, unsupervised, and opaque, and to help develop and promote fairer migrant labor processes that can lead to better outcomes for migrants and their communities.

Within [Omnibus Research Program Name Redacted], the goal of our project was to design and evaluate a blueprint for ethical and safe cross-border labor migration, to be used by governments and NGOs in the future. While designing our project, we paid significant consideration to the ethics of the study. We were mindful of the general obligation of researchers "to anticipate and protect participants from trauma stemming from participation in research" (APSA Committee on Human Subjects Research, 2019). We worked closely with our partners to minimize the potential risks and costs that participants might face, to ensure that the benefits of this program flow to participants and their communities, and to protect participants' informed consent (Teele, 2014; Humphreys, 2015).

We situated the study in Mizoram because of the demand for international employment opportunities, both from individuals and from the state government, in this region. The Government of Mizoram's earlier attempts at training and recruitment had drawn large numbers of youth looking for lucrative international work, given the scarcity of employment opportunities within Mizoram. The Government's Mizoram Youth Commission (MYC), the Chief Minister of Mizoram, and several leading Mizo community organizations sought to create recruitment opportunities for Mizo workers in GCC countries, and called upon researchers to assist in evaluating scientifically processes of skills training and overseas placement that were already underway. By helping connect government and community organizations with reputable partners both inside and outside of India, the program enabled local stakeholders to better screen potential employers, protect citizens during their employment tenures abroad, and facilitate migrant integration. Although we (and the government) could not possibly facilitate supervised employment opportunities for *all* individuals seeking employment abroad, our goal was to help the government and NGOs build an ethical template for future skills development and employment placement programs in the region.

One of the major obstacles to fair labor migration is the high costs of migration, often due to illegal recruitment fees (Sasikumar and Timothy, 2015). Prospective migrants may also be subject

to the possibility of exploitation overseas. We strived to minimize both of these costs and risks for participants. We designed our skills training and placement program for employment within the hospitality sector, which is relatively reputable, remunerative, and desirable compared to sectors where labor violations had previously been reported (e.g., construction or household work). We worked closely with New York University Abu Dhabi's Office for Compliance & Risk Management to carefully vet project partners and employers. We scrutinized our recruitment partner (Vira International) closely and worked alongside Vira International to screen and assess specific employers that entered the placement program for fair recruitment practices, working conditions, and migrant worker treatment. Employers agreed to charge no recruitment fees, sponsor and guide prospective employees through the work visa authorization process for the receiving country, cover expenses for round-trip flights, visas, and other immigration costs, help recruits relocate and find housing abroad, provide competitive salaries and benefits, and enter into labor contracts that permitted workers to switch employers or leave their jobs at any time. All labor contracts were registered with governmental agencies in both home and host countries. To minimize participants' financial obligations, training (including tuition, course materials, and on-the-job training) was provided free of charge. While not all participants may eventually obtain employment in the GCC, their training was deemed broadly useful for jobs in the hospitality sector.

Cognizant of potential power differentials between employees and employers, we strived to fortify participants by informing them of their rights and resources in destination countries. The GCC states have passed several decrees in recent years that require employers to cover recruitment expenses (including visas and costs of travel), provide competitive salaries and benefits, and furnish housing and health fees for foreign workers. New reforms allow workers to leave their jobs at any time (subject to contractual obligations) and make it easier for workers to switch employers. Under the new policies in the U.A.E., for instance, prospective migrants sign a standard employment offer in their home country that is registered at the Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratisation (MoHRE) before a work permit is issued. Once the worker arrives in the country, the agreement becomes registered as the contract and no changes are allowed unless the employer extends further benefits to the worker. Our project provided subjects with detailed information regarding the locations and helpline numbers of MoHRE offices. Additionally, the Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India has established Indian Workers Resource Centres in GCC countries that provide helplines and conduct awareness classes and counseling programs on legal, financial, and social issues. Our project ensured that subjects were aware of these resources and had access to them. In addition, in order to assist with integration and reintegration, our project provided participants with access to comprehensive information regarding legal and counseling services both in the GCC states and in Mizoram.

We took a number of steps to guarantee that participants were provided extensive information regarding the potential risks associated with international employment before agreeing to participate in the training and recruitment program. Individuals attended information sessions detailing opportunities and challenges associated with overseas employment. During these presentations, subjects were informed about the potential risks associated with the process of international employment, including the risk of labor law violations by employers. Additionally, we designed the project such that our field research team would follow up regularly with all participants who undertook employment abroad to check on their wellbeing and safety.

Subjects were required to provide informed consent prior to participating in the study and had the right to withdraw from the project at any point. Additionally, participants had distinct decision points (from participating in surveys and attending the training program to sitting for placement interviews and deciding to accept employment contracts) where they were able to reaffirm or withdraw consent. The informed consent process is central to the study design (Humphreys, 2015;

APSA Committee on Human Subjects Research, 2019): the participants themselves were the parties most affected by the intervention, and they had clearly marked opportunities throughout the process in which to provide and withdraw consent.

Overall, the program was designed to significantly improve and safeguard recruitment and employment processes for prospective migrants as compared to individuals who decided to migrate on their own accord or through unsupervised private channels. It was anticipated that future government initiatives in the region would be able to benefit from the knowledge generated and the connections created by the program.

A.6 Cost-Benefit Comparison for Intervention

Lastly, we conducted a rough estimate of the costs and benefits of our training and recruitment program. This is valuable for two reasons. First, it acts as an impact evaluation for the program as an economic development intervention. Second, it helps inform the discussion of ethical considerations to weigh the benefits for candidates against the costs for researchers.

For costs, we estimated all major costs of conducting the training and recruitment program in 2018 and 2019. This did not include, for example, the costs of the surveys and the time of the research team. It did, however, include travel costs for researchers and for the training program team, as well as all costs for training and placement.

For benefits, we used the endline survey's estimates of monthly wages in the treatment and control groups. On average, individuals in the treatment group had monthly wages approximately 5,650 INR higher at endline than those in the control group. We extrapolated this number, therefore, over the full treatment and control groups and estimated the increase in wages per year.

Overall, we estimate that the program generated about 900 USD per person per year in benefits to candidates against just over 200 USD per person in costs. Despite only about 20% of the treatment group moving overseas for work, the intervention was extremely cost-effective overall.

Table A.1: Costs and Benefits of the Program

Costs of Intervention	
Training Program (USD)	22,200
Location Rental for Training (USD)	4,000
Advertising & Registration Costs (USD)	1,000
Visa & Certification Assistance for Candidates (USD)	1,700
One Year of Salary for Program Manager (USD)	8,000
Travel Costs for Research Team (USD)	6,000
Total Cost (USD)	**42,900**
Cost Per Person (USD)	**219**
Benefits (Per Year)	
Monthly Wages Increase Per Person (INR)	5,650
Yearly Wages Increase Per Person (INR)	**67,800**
Yearly Wages Increase Per Person (USD)	**904**

B Balance and Attrition

B.1 Balance Table

The following regressions attempt to predict treatment status by pre-treatment covariates, among each of the three sample stages (the job candidates both pre-treatment and post-treatment, and the household members post-treatment). The covariates include both demographic characteristics and pre-treatment measures of key outcome variables. We find little evidence of significant differences between treatment and control group in any of the three survey stages, even after attrition. In fact, the treatment groups were remarkably balanced. Just one of the ten pre-treatment covariates predicted treatment status, and only on the endline survey. This 1/30 is lower than the expected false-positive rate of .05, and any pre-treatment imbalances should be accounted for in the statistical analysis in Section 4 anyway. Overall, the omnibus F-test (p-values at the bottom) shows that even the combination of all ten variables provides no predictive value on treatment group on any of the three surveys. This balance is partly because the subjects were grouped into demographically similar pairs for treatment assignment – when this is considered (in the RI-based F-test), the p-values become less strikingly high.

Table A.2: Balance Test for Three Surveys

	Dependent variable: Treatment Group		
	Baseline	Endline	Household
Age	−0.008	−0.004	−0.010
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Male	0.001	−0.041	−0.040
	(0.053)	(0.066)	(0.059)
Education	0.027	0.064	0.016
	(0.032)	(0.041)	(0.036)
Employed	−0.030	−0.067	−0.054
	(0.077)	(0.102)	(0.091)
Scheduled Tribe	−0.029	−0.073	−0.053
	(0.123)	(0.165)	(0.133)
Married	0.122	0.312	0.122
	(0.200)	(0.310)	(0.262)
English Ability	−0.004	−0.001	−0.005
	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.029)
Pre: Income	0.001	0.013	0.013
	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.016)
Pre: Tolerance	0.034	0.063**	0.018
	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.030)
Pre: Migration Support	0.016	0.015	0.017
	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.032)
Observations	389	248	303
F-Test P-Value	.940	.517	.955
F-Test P-Value (RI)	.773	.335	.884

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B.2 Tests for Attrition Bias

In addition to the balance tests before and after treatment (and attrition), we also conducted two tests for attrition bias in the endline and household surveys.

First, we tested whether attrition was greatly affected by treatment assignment itself – i.e. whether the differences in response rates between the treatment and control groups are larger than what might be expected based purely on chance. There is no significant evidence that treatment is affecting response rate in the main survey, but there is evidence that the treatment may have decreased response rates in the household survey. In the main candidate survey, the treatment group had a slightly higher response rate (76% vs. 72%), but this is fully within the normal range of variation. The p-values suggest that under the null hypothesis we would expect a larger difference between the treatment and control groups in approximately 30% of cases. In the household survey, however, the control group households responded at a significantly higher rate (84% vs. 70%), which is statistically significant at a $p < .01$ level. This suggests that there may be some attrition bias resulting from differential response rates.

Table A.3: Response Rates: Treatment vs. Control Group

	Endline	*Household*
Response Rate: Treatment Group	76.0 %	70.4%
Response Rate: Control Group	71.9 %	84.2%
Difference in Response Rate	4.1 %	13.8%
P-Value: Two-Sample T-Test	.296	.001
P-Value: RI-based Test	.268	.002

We also tested whether response rates for the endline and household surveys were affected by any pre-treatment covariates. For each survey, we ran three regressions predicting survey response based on pre-treatment covariates. The first column predicts response rates based on the seven key demographic covariates. The second column adds in the pre-treatment measures of the key outcome variables: economic status, economic confidence, and economic policy attitudes. The third column adds in interaction terms to test whether each of these covariates differentially affects response in treatment and control groups.

Here, again, there is no evidence that attrition in the endline survey was systematic, but some suggestive evidence that household survey responses may have been. In the endline survey, there were just three predictive covariates out of all the models (which is consistent with a .05 false-positive rate), and the omnibus f-test suggests that the model as a whole is no more predictive of response rates than randomly-generated covariates would be (with p-values between .2 and .5). In the household survey, there was slight evidence that respondents were different from non-respondents, though it was statistically marginal (with p-values between .04 and .08). In particular, there may be a reasonable concern that respondents for the household survey were significantly less likely to be from households where the candidate had a job in the first place – though this was not substantially different in the treatment and control groups.

Table A.4: Predictors of Response Rate: Endline

	Dependent variable: Response		
Age	0.001	−0.001	−0.006
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Education	0.018	0.014	−0.018
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.042)
Scheduled Tribe	0.123	0.108	0.154
	(0.116)	(0.117)	(0.180)
Employed	−0.098	−0.110	0.042
	(0.072)	(0.104)	(0.150)
Married	−0.137	−0.140	−0.072
	(0.190)	(0.193)	(0.324)
Male	−0.031	−0.042	0.014
	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.072)
English Ability	0.043*	0.036	0.040
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.034)
Economic Status		0.008	−0.069
		(0.039)	(0.052)
Economic Confidence		0.047	0.024
		(0.038)	(0.052)
Economic Attitudes		−0.004	−0.048
		(0.024)	(0.032)
Treatment			−0.714
			(0.604)
Treat x Age			0.011
			(0.017)
Treat x Education			0.066
			(0.062)
Treat x ST			−0.064
			(0.242)
Treat x Employed			−0.317
			(0.209)
Treat x Married			−0.093
			(0.410)
Treat x Male			−0.135
			(0.102)
Treat x English			−0.014
			(0.049)
Treat x Econ. Status			0.175**
			(0.078)
Treat x Econ. Confidence			0.061
			(0.075)
Treat x Econ. Attitudes			0.087*
			(0.048)
Observations	389	384	384
F-Stat P-Value	.314	.461	.220

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.5: Predictors of Response Rate: Household Survey

	Dependent variable: Response		
Age	0.010	0.011	0.015
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)
Education	0.023	0.026	0.047
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.036)
Scheduled Tribe	−0.057	−0.035	−0.020
	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.154)
Employed	−0.128**	−0.133**	−0.101
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.088)
Married	−0.191	−0.184	−0.214
	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.275)
Male	−0.019	−0.014	0.045
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.061)
English Ability	0.031	0.027	0.026
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.029)
Pre: Income		0.013	0.002
		(0.012)	(0.017)
Pre: Tolerance		0.022	0.044
		(0.021)	(0.030)
Pre: Migration		0.031	0.031
		(0.023)	(0.031)
Treatment			0.173
			(0.427)
Treat x Age			−0.010
			(0.015)
Treat x Education			−0.034
			(0.054)
Treat x ST			−0.022
			(0.207)
Treat x Employed			−0.055
			(0.127)
Treat x Married			0.058
			(0.347)
Treat x Male			−0.117
			(0.086)
Treat x English			0.0002
			(0.041)
Treat x Income			0.024
			(0.024)
Treat x Tolerance			−0.035
			(0.042)
Treat x Migration			−0.0004
			(0.045)
Observations	389	389	389
F Stat P-value	.080*	.044**	.058*
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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C Key Outcome Questions

Table A.6: Questions: Intercultural Contact

Question	Options
How often have you shared a meal with someone of a different *religion or church	ethnicity (non-Mizo)	country (non-Indian)*?	Almost daily A few times a week A few times a month A few times a year Never
How often have you worked alongside someone of a different *religion or church	ethnicity (non-Mizo)	country (non-Indian)*?	Almost daily A few times a week A few times a month A few times a year Never

Table A.7: Questions: Intercultural Tolerance

Question	Options
Could you tell me whether your general feeling about each group of people is positive or negative?: Indians from Mizoram European people Bangladeshi people Pakistani people Middle Eastern people	Very positive Somewhat positive Neither positive nor negative Somewhat negative Very negative
Would it be acceptable to you if someone in your family married someone of a different ethnic group (e.g. non-Mizo)?	Yes No

Table A.8: Questions: Internationalism

Question	Options
On balance, how do you think international trade affects people's lives around the world?	Improves them a lot
	Improves them a little
	Does not affect them much
	Hurts them a little
	Hurts them a lot
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Peace with Pakistan is important for India's future.	Agree strongly
	Agree somewhat
	Neither agree nor disagree
	Disagree somewhat
	Disagree strongly
On balance, how do you think people migrating from one country to another affects people's lives around the world	Improves them a lot
	Improves them a little
	Does not affect them much
	Hurts them a little
	Hurts them a lot
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The Government of Mizoram should work to prevent people from migrating from Bangladesh into Mizoram?	Agree strongly
	Agree somewhat
	Neither agree nor disagree
	Disagree somewhat
	Disagree strongly

Table A.9: Questions: Nationalism

Question	Options
Do you see yourself more as a Mizo or as an Indian?	Much more as a Mizo Somewhat more as a Mizo Both about the same Somewhat more as an Indian Much more as an Indian
Could you tell me whether your general feeling about each group of people is positive or negative?: Indians from Mainland India	Very Positive Positive Neutral Negative Very Negative
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Mizoram should be much more autonomous and independent from other parts of India.	Agree strongly Agree somewhat Neither agree nor disagree Disagree somewhat Disagree strongly
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The Government of Mizoram should work to prevent people from migrating from mainland India into Mizoram?	Strongly agree Somewhat agree Neither agree nor disagree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree
In general, how interested are you in the following types of events?: National Politics	Very Interested Somewhat Interested Not At All Interested

Table A.10: Questions: Identity

Question	Options
People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Which of the following statements do you agree with most?	I see myself as a citizen of the world I see myself as part of the Indian nation I see myself as a Mizo. I see myself as part of my local community I see myself as an individual.

D   Main Results

Table A.11: Full Results: Migration

	Diff-in-Means			OLS			
	Ctrl	*Treat*	*P(RI)*	*ATE*	*P(RI)*	*P(OLS)*	*N*
Moved Overseas	.03	.23	.000	+ .20	.000	.000	248
Training Program	.43	.58	.011	+ .14	.009	.012	245
Job Offer	.08	.34	.000	+ .26	.000	.000	231
Moved in India	.32	.13	.000	− .19	.000	.000	247

Table A.12: Full Results: Intercultural Contact

	Diff-in-Means			OLS			
	Ctrl	*Treat*	*P(RI)*	*ATE*	*P(RI)*	*P(OLS)*	*N*
Contact Index	—	.481	.001	+.487	.001	.001	248
Meal w/ Non-Christian	2.28	2.61	.032	+.34	.031	.032	248
Meal w/ Non-Mizo	2.18	2.66	.003	+.49	.002	.003	248
Meal w/ Non-Indian	1.49	2.13	.000	+.64	.000	.000	247
Work w/ Non-Christian	2.79	2.99	.130	+.20	.131	.141	248
Work w/ Non-Mizo	2.72	2.98	.074	+.27	.070	.068	248
Work w/ Non-Indian	1.59	2.26	.000	+.67	.000	.000	247

All items are measured from 1 (never) to 5 (every day).

Table A.13: Full Results: Intercultural Tolerance

	Diff-in-Means			OLS			
	Ctrl	*Treat*	*P(RI)*	*ATE*	*P(RI)*	*P(OLS)*	*N*
Tolerance Index	—	.371	.002	+.354	.004	.003	248
OK to Marry Non-Mizo	.52	.65	.022	+.13	.022	.018	248
View of Bangladeshis (1-5)	2.95	3.08	.051	+.13	.041	.043	248
View of Pakistanis (1-5)	2.90	3.01	.076	+.11	.072	.071	248
View of Middle Easterners (1-5)	3.01	3.23	.001	+.21	.002	.001	248
View of Europeans (1-5)	3.14	3.25	.046	+.11	.045	.051	248

Note: For most measures of tolerance, both treatment and control individuals measured lower at the endline than at the baseline. Given that the surveys were nearly two and a half years apart, and that these comparisons are observational, we are cautious about drawing significant conclusions. We think it most likely that these declines in tolerance are driven by one of two causes: (1) the COVID-19 pandemic, which was at its peak during the endline survey, may have encouraged intolerance toward outgroups; or (2) the respondents may have partially self-selected for the program based on their baseline levels of tolerance and interest in foreign experiences and experienced some regression to the mean on these dimensions.

Table A.14: Full Results: Support for International Cooperation

	Diff-in-Means			OLS			
	Ctrl	*Treat*	*P(RI)*	*ATE*	*P(RI)*	*P(OLS)*	*N*
Intl Cooperation Index	—	**.231**	**.038**	**+ .231**	**.038****	**.039****	**248**
Trade Improves Lives	4.04	4.27	.023**	+ .23	.023**	.022**	248
Peace w/ Pakistan is Important	3.87	3.98	.206	+ .12	.179	.180	248
Migration Index	—	**.125**	**.156**	**+ .123**	**.161**	**.164**	**248**
Migration Improves Lives	3.39	3.47	.279	+ .08	.278	.269	248
Support Bangladeshi Migration	2.66	2.78	.194	+ .11	.198	.207	248
Interest in International News	—	**.212**	**.063***	**+ .211**	**.066***	**.067***	**248**
Identify Most as World Citizen	.14	.23	.027**	+.10	.025**	.025**	247

All items are measured from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree).

Table A.15: Full Results: National vs. Regional Identity

	Diff-in-Means			OLS			
	Ctrl	*Treat*	*P(RI)*	*ATE*	*P(RI)*	*P(OLS)*	*N*
Identify more as Indian than as Mizo	2.26	2.17	.526	− .09	.532	.515	247
View of Mainland Indians	3.22	3.39	.021**	+ .17	.017**	.020**	248
Mizoram should be less Autonomous	2.93	3.04	.481	+ .11	.487	.498	248
OK with Indians moving to Mizoram	1.92	2.09	.243	+ .16	.250	.234	248
Interest in National Politics	1.66	1.84	.020**	+ .18	.015**	.014**	248

Items 1-4 are measured from 1 (Strongly Disagree or Very Negative) to 5 (Strongly Agree or Very Positive). Item 5 is measured from 1 (not at all interested) to 3 (very interested).

E   Multiple Comparisons Analysis

As specified in the pre-analysis plan, we also provide a Benjamini-Hochberg false discovery rate analysis for the sub-hypotheses – except for the national and cosmopolitan identity hypotheses, which were listed separately. The below analysis uses a conservative false discovery rate of $Q < .05$. The correction does not flag any otherwise statistically significant results. That is, the same 6 of 10 results that fall below the $p < .05$ significance level on their own also fall below the B-H corrected significance threshold. Meanwhile, the one additional result that meets the $p < .10$ significance level (Interest in International Politics) would also meet the B-H corrected threshold with a corresponding false discovery rate of $Q < .10$.

Table A.16: Benjamini-Hochberg Correction, International Hypotheses

	P-Value	Target
H6a: Intercultural Contact	.001	.01
H6b: Intercultural Tolerance	.004	.02
H6c: Support for Intl Cooperation	.038	.03
H6e: Interest in Intl Politics	.063	.04
H6d: Support for Intl Migration	.156	.05

Table A.17: Benjamini-Hochberg Correction, National Hypotheses

	P-Value	Target
H7a: Intercultural Contact	.001	.01
H7e: Interest in Indian Politics	.020	.02
H7b: Tolerance of Mainland Indians	.021	.03
H7d: Support for Internal Migration	.243	.04
H7c: Support for Indian Integration	.481	.05

F   Exploratory Tests for Mechanisms

Table A.18: Full Results: Household Members

	Diff-in-Means			OLS			
	Ctrl	*Treat*	*P(RI)*	*ATE*	*P(RI)*	*P(OLS)*	*N*
Contact Index	—	+.076	.267	+.077	.268	.257	301
Discussed Foreign Religions?	.26	.29	.324	+.03	.326	.318	300
Discussed Foreign Discrimination?	.23	.27	.219	+.04	.224	.223	301
Tolerance Index	—	−.045	.669	−.054	.698	.692	304
OK to Marry Non-Mizo?	.36	.33	.666	−.02	.651	.661	293
View of Indians	4.15	4.07	.844	−.10	.868	.868	302
View of Bangladeshis	2.30	2.31	.475	+.01	.469	.461	302
View of Pakistanis	2.25	2.27	.444	+.02	.448	.442	297
View of Middle Easterners	2.80	2.96	.044	+.17	.042	.034	295
View of Europeans	3.95	3.77	.959	−0.18	.961	.959	302
International Cooperation Index	—	−.134	.871	−.119	.844	.852	304
Migration Improves Lives	2.59	2.51	.724	−0.00	.508	.507	304
Support Migration into India	1.33	1.23	.847	−.09	.822	.837	302

Figure A.3: Change over Time in Tolerance, Migrants vs. Non-Migrants

Table A.19: Effect of Training Attendance, Control Group Only

			Dependent variable:			
	Tolerance	Contact	Supp. Coop.	Supp. Mig.	Intl Interest	Cit. of World
Training	0.262	0.421**	0.213	−0.066	0.189	0.095
	(0.171)	(0.185)	(0.186)	(0.190)	(0.185)	(0.064)
Age	−0.008	0.010	0.017	−0.043	0.052*	−0.006
	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.011)
Male	−0.163	−0.024	0.387**	0.018	0.314	0.038
	(0.175)	(0.194)	(0.191)	(0.195)	(0.190)	(0.066)
Employed	−0.011	0.260	0.086	−0.062	0.102	0.100
	(0.259)	(0.300)	(0.286)	(0.288)	(0.285)	(0.097)
Married	−3.559***	0.057	1.090	1.775	−1.545	−0.192
	(1.027)	(1.113)	(1.120)	(1.137)	(1.116)	(0.385)
Education	−0.017	−0.157	0.043	−0.036	0.172	−0.045
	(0.105)	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.117)	(0.113)	(0.039)
ST	0.439	0.054	1.014**	0.959*	0.698	−0.115
	(0.462)	(0.505)	(0.505)	(0.513)	(0.503)	(0.173)
Baseline Outcome	0.192**	0.160	0.021	−0.007	−0.058	−0.029
	(0.088)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.093)	(0.102)	(0.068)
Obs.	118	118	118	118	118	117

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

G   Qualitative Evidence

Table A.20: Long-form Interview Quotes on Contact from Treatment Group Individuals

Question	ID	Answer
Who are the people you interact with regularly? How would you describe your relationship with them?	144	I had a roommate from Odisha, and there was one Manipuri named Sam, I hang out with them the most and I am still in contact with them.
	156	Yes, when I reached the country my roommates were an Indian from Mumbai and a Bangladeshi, but we were not close. I hang out with people from the Philippines the most, even our branch manager who was a Filipino [would] hang out with me and even invited me to his birthday celebration. I think I was comfortable with people from the Philippines because of our similarity in our looks, our physical appearance and they were broad minded as compared to the others. And also as they were Christian and our lifestyle is somehow similar compared to people from other places. [...] There were also newcomers from Arabia and Africa who joined after us, I am also close to these people and we are still in contact.
	179	I was close with people from other part of India and Nepal and Bhutan, I am lucky because I know how to speak Hindi so I was able to hangout with them.
	228	My teammates were from Egypt and Nepal and I hang out with the Nepali guy a lot.
	239	There are many Indians and Filipinos, and I hang out with my roommates the most. We are on good terms and I am still in contact with them.
	26	There are many Egyptians, Filipinos, and Nepalis and I hang out with them besides the Mizo people.
	261	I didn't hang out with my coworkers outside work, but I was close with other Mizo workers and my roommate and neighbors.
	27	I hang out with the Mizo people I went with and we are good buddies.
	295	I am personally close with my previous manager, he is from the Philippines and he took care of me because I was the only Indian at our store, so he is very kind to me and although we are now working in different stores, we still keep in touch and meet up if we have time.
	335	I hang out with my co-workers the most, they were mostly Filipinos, we are in good terms and they are very nice people.
	349	There are many Filipinos and most of my co-workers and all my roommates were from the Philippines so I hangout with them the most.

	355	I hangout with the Mizo crowd only because I feel more safe and comfortable with them than people from other places.
	360	Yes I have made a best friend who is from Bhutan and our friendship is very good and strong.
	40	I hang out with other Indians and we are really on good terms, they don't really care about the fact that I look a bit different from them.
	44	I hung out with the other Mizo roommates a lot, and I was on good terms with my co-workers, they are from the Philippines, Indonesia and Nepal.
	59	I hang out with Filipinos the most because somehow the food we like to eat is similar so there is a sense of being familiar and comfortable with them and in work and at home I am fine and close with everyone I spend time with.
	80	I was close with the local people from Saudi and I hang out with them the most, and sometimes I hang out with Filipinos.
	88	My co-workers are from different places like Egypt, the Philippines and Nepal; we all get along really well and we all are on good terms with each other so work is also fun.
Do you interact with clients/customers? Can you describe your interactions with them?	144	Yes, I interact with the customers a lot, overall I think it was good, whenever they give me feedback I always receive good ones and there were some customers who asked me to work for them at their stores, so I think I had a pleasant experience. But there were many rude customers as well, most of them are Saudi people and because of cultural differences we think we did offend them at times. Mostly tourists from Europe and America were nice.
	239	Yes I do, it was required for my job and many of my customers mistake me as a Filipino a lot of times, except for the Arabs, I always had a pleasant interaction with our customers. We also had many Europeans, Indians and Filipinos as customers and most of the time they are always nice and polite.
What about the people you stay with? And whom do you stay with?	156	Our cashier helped me find a flat where her Nepali friends live, so I joined the Nepalis in their flat and share the apartment with them, there were 4 of them, so we were 5 in total.

Can you describe us the people who live in your neighborhood/apartment/hostel? Do you interact with them and what do you think about them?	156	My last roommates were Nepalis and Bengalis, we were 5 of us. Yes, I do interact with them and we get along very well and we hang out a lot. But I hang out with our cashier the most because our flat was close to each other and we would go for work and come back home together. Also, there was a new roommate before I left the country and he was from Bangladesh, I am close with him. I still keep in touch with them including my first roommate who was also from Bangladesh. I like hanging out with all of them and as I never had any problem with anyone, so I like everyone and I had a great time with them.
Have you made new friends? Who do you spend the most time with? What are the things that you do together?	239	Yes, my teammates and roommates were my friends, we all are in good terms and we do almost everything together. I have 3 roommates: one is from Darjeeling and two are from Manipur. So, yeah, whenever we go out, it is us that hang out together, we would usually eat out somewhere nice or visit the mall or sometimes the beach.
	335	Yes I am close with my teammates and flatmates and we go sightseeing whenever we get a chance.
	349	I spend most of my time with Filipinos and sometimes my other Mizo friends if we have time to hangout.
	355	Yeah, I made a few friends from Nepal and Egypt. Most of us were all busy with our own work so we hardly get to do anything together to have fun except work.
	360	Yes, as I have become good friends with a Bhutanese we do everything together and we even joined a new company together.
	40	My co-workers are my friends, and we go to hotels to enjoy the food and we go sightseeing sometimes.
	60	Yes, my co-workers, we stay in an apartment together so they are new family for me.

Table A.21: Long-form Interview Quotes on Contact from Control Group Individuals

Question	ID	Answer
Can you describe to us the people who live in your neighborhood/apartment/hostel?	125	I haven't had the chance to interact with anyone as we are under lockdown but I am hoping they are nice people.
Do you interact with them and what do you think about them?	150	I know almost everyone in my locality and even they know our family as we have been staying here since years back so I like the people here and I have a good relationship with everyone I know.
	16	We visit each other sometimes but due to the pandemic, it's not a good idea to go to someone's house so I haven't had many chances to visit my neighbors but so far they are very kind.
	3	Yes, I do interact with them, they are good people so I don't have any problems with them.
	303	They are good people and we are all close with one another.
	320	Yes, I do interact with them and everyone in our colony lives in harmony and we are close with one another.
	371	Well they are nice people and yeah we are on good terms.
	46	Our neighbors are good people, we always interact whenever we see each other.
	94	Yes, so I am in a hostel and everyone is close with each other as I have mentioned.
Do you have friends living around you? Who do you spend the most time with? What are the things that you do together?	125	None of my friends live nearby, but I have started involving myself with MZP (local student organization), so I hang out with the people involved there the most.
	16	Of course, I have many friends, but my best friend is from a different place and I hang out with him the most, he's close with my family and I am close with his, so we are more like a family.
	23	None of my friends live close by, I spend more time working and I have two helpers at work so I spend lots of time with them and besides them it's my wife and daughter.
	266	I don't have that many close friends in our locality because I have been living away studying and I only came home in 2018, and I mostly hang out with my schoolmates from diff locality.
	3	I don't really have friends separately, I have people working with me so they are the people I spend the most time with, and when we can, we attend Church. I was active in Church activity so everyone who were involved were like friends.
	303	Yes, I do but due to the lockdown we don't get to see each other much, so I mostly spend time with my family.

	46	My friends don't live nearby, so I mostly play and spend time with my niece, she's 5.
Who are the people you interact with regularly? How would you describe your relationship with them?	150	And through this work I get to interact a lot with many people, including village heads and other heads of the society, and I have found good friends through this job whom I can call as best friends.
	16	As I am the Showroom Executive, these days there is not much work for me as we cannot open the store regularly, and my job is to take note of everything that the employees are doing and to make sure that everything runs smoothly, so instead of interacting with our customers I am more in charge of the other employees.
	336	I mostly hangout with other Mizo workers there (in Goa).
Can you describe the town where you currently live? What is it like to live there?	23	I am very new to this place because we only shifted here last November, so I haven't had many friends here. It's not so bad living here, I think the people here are generally very nice and there's not much I like or dislike about this place.
	266	It's quite nice, my mom is the head of our locality so everyone knows us here and we live a pretty decent normal life. Since we've been living here since 1999, it is our home and the people are nice and there's not much to not like about this place.
	3	People here are nice and I think it is one of the best villages to live in because if one is hard working there are many options to earn a living here especially agriculture wise. One reason I don't like living in a village is we are of very small population so almost everyone knows each other and there is no space for privacy and there is a lot of gossip going around, but generally I like living here.

Table A.22: **Quotes from Long-form Interviews on Diversity**

Question	ID	Answer
Based on your experience working in the Gulf, do you think Mizos would be more likely to face discrimination in employment in the Gulf or in mainland India?	261	I think in mainland India because in Dubai we are a mix of people from different countries and people are exposed to that difference in culture so no one is racist here...
	295	I think discrimination is more in mainland India [...] And in my workplace, so far there is no racism towards anyone because we all are from different places like Nepal, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, etc., so everyone here accepts the diversity more than [they do] in India.
	335	From my experience, I think Gulf is much better because there are many people here from different parts of the world and the people here are more welcoming to foreigners.

Question	ID	Answer
	360	I think in mainland India because in Dubai we are a mix of people from different countries so we accept the diversity much more here.
	40	I think we will face it more in mainland India because they are already racist towards us. Here at the Gulf we are a mix of different races so no one really cares where we are from.
	59	[...] here the local people are not racist towards any group of people and also because so many of us here are from different countries, we are more accepting.
	80	I would prefer working in the Gulf countries because over there we get to meet people from different countries, cultural and religious backgrounds and people are more open-minded and nicer than most Indians.
Compared to people from mainland India, do you think you have been treated more or less favorably in your workplace? Or where you live?	156	We were treated pretty equally; the people around me were not racist at all.
	355	We were not treated differently with the mainland Indians, but in our company there are many Arabs and Filipinos so they are always partial toward people of their own race.
	360	No, there is no discrimination as such...
	60	I haven't faced any racism here and I don't think there is favouritism between race, but even mainland Indian workers here don't believe when we say we are from India as we cannot speak Hindi.
How did you feel?	228	I [found] the importance of working with people from different places and teamwork.
Compared to your friends back home, how is your life different living in [new country]?	239	I was able to explore more and I think I have a better understanding of people from different cultural background and as a person I am more confident than I was before.
What do you like about [new country]?	261	I think the fact that I am in a country I never thought I will get the chance to visit is memorable and meeting people from different cultures and religions is also memorable.
	360	I like the country generally and I get to make new friends who are not Mizo and I am able to visit many places.
What are the aspects of your work that you enjoy and why?	59	I enjoy talking to our customers because we get people from different cultural backgrounds and I think that is valuable because if I was working in Mizoram I would not have such exposure.

Table A.23: **Quotes from Long-Form Interviews on Changing Opinions After Migration**

Question	ID	Answer

How did you feel or what was your first impression like?	156	If I'm being very honest ..., I was actually a little bit scared because the place where I was put up to stay was a bit unwelcoming for me in the sense that the building designs were very traditional [...]. But it was only my first impression because when I get to know the people ... they were very nice and welcoming.
How is the Middle East different from what you have expected?	60	Because I haven't been to the Middle East I didn't know what to expect but the people here are more conservative than us and the mainland Indians.
	40	I was actually a bit scared because I used to wonder if it is safe to say that I am a Christian because most of them are Muslims, but it is totally opposite of that, no one is bothered that I'm a Christian so no one here is really bothered about religion.
	80	Yes, it is very different in a good way, [...], but I think Saudi is much better and more developed and much bigger, and there are people who tell me that there are lots of discrimination between male and female [...] but it wasn't like that at all, of course, there are strict rules but it wasn't so bad as I was expecting.
Was there anything about living in a new country that was particularly surprising or difficult?	40	No, I don't have any difficulty living here because wherever we go we are very safe as long as we obey the laws. It is, in fact, exactly the opposite of what I thought it would be. Because it is a Muslim country, I had a feeling people will be evil and stuff, but it is just the opposite of that.
Have you discussed your experience living in the Gulf with friends and family? What are the things that you tell them about? Does anything surprise them?	80	But one thing that surprised them the most is how sincere they are with their religion because they always wash their feet before entering the mosque and sometimes I think they are more religious than many Christians.